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ABSTRACT
Increasing urbanization in a global setting of political and economic instability
indicates that urban warfare may well be the major conflict scenario of the 21st century.
The United States armed forces are not currently prepared to meet that challenge. The
last major urban conflict involving the American military was the Battle of Hue during
the Vietnam War. As part of the Tet Offensive in 1968, Communist forces seized control
of Hue and held it for nearly a month.
Having undergone intensive tactical training for their mission, the enemy, solidly
entrenched in buildings of various kinds, offered fierce resistance to the American and
South Vietnamese troops who tried to reconquer the city. U.S. Marines bore the brunt of
the fighting. Untrained and unequipped for street-fighting, they encountered immense
difficulties in clearing Hue. Faulty intelligence, command and control problems, and a
lack of proper equipment made the experience a nightmarish one and the human cost was
considerable: 147 Marines and seventy-four soldiers lost their lives, while a combined
total of 1,364 were wounded. Only through raw determination, superior firepower, and
adaptive leadership were the Marines able to prevail.
The Battle of Hue offered critical lessons for subsequent military planners. Later
conflicts in places such as Somalia and Afghanistan suggested that Hue might be more
relevant than expected for contemporary warfare. As a result, the U.S. armed forces have
made significant strides toward correcting deficiencies in the areas of doctrine, training,
and equipment. However, they remain under-prepared for urban warfare because they
are still not training as a joint and combined arms team across the full spectrum of
operations. This is in large part due to continued shortfalls in training infrastructure and
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lack of equipment. U.S. armed forces must continue to maximize urban operations
training at every level in order to validate doctrine, learn how to fight, and develop
specialized equipment for urban operations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The best lesson learned is that imagination and aggressiveness are the best weapons
in our arsenal. The Marines who fought the battle used those weapons.
- Captain George R. Christmas, CO, Company H, 2-5 Marines1
After further reflection upon the brutal combat at Hue in 1968, Captain George R.
Christmas, newly decorated with the Navy Cross, expressed those thoughts that
symbolized the heroic deeds of countless Marines and soldiers who fought and died in
one of the most significant urban battles since World War II. Several historians have
written detailed accounts of the bloody battles that raged to recapture Hue, yet they have
all slighted the crucial lessons learned and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs)
developed by U.S. Marines and, more importantly, their applicability for the battlefield of
today and tomorrow. This thesis analyzes the Battle of Hue in order to pinpoint those
hard-fought TTPs learned in an urban conflict and suggest lessons for training for future
conflicts in an ever-volatile urban environment.
American armed forces, particularly the Army and Marine Corps, devoted little
attention to urban warfare during the 1960s. United States strategy focused on massed
conventional warfare on the German plains and on emerging jungle war fighting. U.S.
military doctrine gave only a cursory glance at urban operations. In effect, U.S. land
warfare doctrine concentrated on potential conflict with the Soviet Union in Europe and
on small-scale conventional operations to contain the spread of Communism throughout
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Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, where very few battles would be urban in
nature.
A fresh perspective on urban operations shapes this examination of lessons derived
from the Battle of Hue. Most studies to date focus on the overall operations conducted
there as part of a larger assessment of the Tet offensive; however, the evolving trend of
urban conflicts makes Hue a valuable case study in urban warfare that yields insights into
the likely impact of terrain, tactics, techniques, and training that are essential on
tomorrow’s battlefield.
This thesis explores the significance of the battle in relation to the overall defeat of
the North Vietnamese during the Tet offensive and the impact the Battle for Hue had on
evolving tactics and the changing nature of warfare. It considers urban operations from
both the U.S. and North Vietnamese perspective to determine how each viewed the other
and their adaptive techniques. It provides a different approach to analyzing the pertinent
lessons learned and TTPs derived during the battle to meet the Marines’ immediate needs
to root out an entrenched enemy in difficult terrain. Finally, this work provides a tactical
model for future ground conflicts in urban environments.
As the world’s resources become scarce, there is a movement of populations from
rural to urban areas. Current estimates show that by 2025, nearly 85 percent of the
world’s population will reside within urban cities and megalopolises.2 The quest for
survival and wealth will ignite urban conflicts that probably will cause devastating
casualties among combatants and civilians. Adversarial forces seek to use urban terrain
as an important enabler against U.S. technological and resource superiority. This causes
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American armed forces to reexamine the Cold War era urban war-fighting doctrine in
order to develop an evolving doctrine to meet the challenges of urban operations.
The Battle for Hue presents a sterling example of the potential challenges U.S. forces
may face in urban areas. Setting the stage for the Battle for Hue requires an historical
overview of when and how the U.S. deployed large ground forces to South Vietnam and
what North Vietnam’s plan was to coerce the U.S. into leaving South Vietnam and end
the conflict.
President Lyndon Johnson, fearful of a communist seizure of the Republic of
South Vietnam (RVN), on March 6, 1965 authorized the landing of two battalions of the
U.S. 9th Marine Expeditionary Force to secure the U.S. air base at DaNang, South
Vietnam.3 These forces began landing on March 8, 1965 and commenced the process of
taking control of combat operations throughout South Vietnam. Within a month, Johnson
authorized U.S. ground forces to build-up combat power and initiated offensive combat
operations in Vietnam to support the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) government and assist
in training the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). Prior to these events, U.S.
forces had limited their efforts to supporting the RVN government with advisors and
tactical air support to assist ARVN forces in routing the North Vietnamese Army (NVA)
and Viet Cong (VC) forces. The inability of the South Vietnamese to contain North
Vietnamese forces caused Johnson to commit U.S. ground forces to defend South
Vietnam. The deployment of U.S. Marines and subsequent massive build-up of forces
marked a substantial shift in U.S. policy with regard to South Vietnam and containment
of Communist expansion in Southeast Asia. By the end of 1965 there were 184,300
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American troops in Vietnam and that number more than doubled over the next two years,
a clear demonstration of U.S. resolve to support the South Vietnamese government.4
General William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Advisory
Command Vietnam (MACV) deployed U.S. ground forces throughout South Vietnam to
augment ARVN units and prevent the seizure of major cities and villages. Military
planners divided Vietnam into four corps tactical zones and conducted combat operations
against NVA and VC forces. U.S. troops fought their first major engagement against
large concentrations of NVA regulars in the Ia Drang valley in November 1965.
Although the NVA soldiers demonstrated their competence as jungle warriors, the
overwhelming capabilities of airpower, heli-borne assault, superior firepower and
maneuver proved too much for them, causing the Communist political leaders to
reevaluate its strategy against the United States. Allied large-scale search and destroy
operations caused significant attrition among NVA/VC personnel, faster than they could
recruit replacements. The success of U.S. and South Vietnamese operations between
November 1965 and December 1967, however, did not stop NVA infiltration into South
Vietnam.5 Despite the stalemate at the end of 1967 and intelligence indications that a
major Communist offensive was imminent, General Westmoreland, recalled to
Washington to brief President Johnson, was optimistic about the course of the war. As he
remarked at the National Press Club on November 21, 1967, “We were currently moving
into what I now called Phase Three, in which in addition to continuing to destroy the
enemy, we were to increase our efforts to build up the Vietnamese armed forces. Then in
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a final Phase Four we would begin to ‘phase down’ American units while turning over
more and more responsibility to the Vietnamese.”6
The Communist campaign plan of 1968, Tong Kong Kich-Tong Khoi Nghia
(TCK-TKN) – General Offensive-General Uprising7, would not only alter
Westmoreland’s plan for withdrawal but topple an American president. What was unique
about TCK-TKN was the scope of the operation, the level of detailed planning and
preparation, and the synchronized execution never before witnessed during the Vietnam
War. Hanoi’s plan demonstrated overwhelming resolve to continue the fighting until
achievement of its strategic and operational objectives.
The planning for the Tet offensive commenced at the conclusion of the 13th
Plenum of the Communist Party of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the spring of
1967 in Hanoi. Communist leaders decided the time was right for an all-out effort to
strike a decisive blow against the South Vietnamese and their allies. This grand offensive
had to offset the devastating losses inflicted by vigorous U.S. and ARVN operations. Its
purpose was threefold: provoke a general uprising among the South Vietnamese people,
destroy ARVN forces in a series of decisive battles, and erode American political and
military will.8 The campaign plan called for assaults on large American bases and
headquarters, triggering U.S. forces to protect those installations and leaving ARVN units
to defend the major urban centers. The offensive involved attacks on every major South
Vietnamese city. The Communists used the summer and fall of 1967 to move massive
numbers of troops, equipment, and supplies into the countryside near major cities. Phase
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1 of TCK-TKN began in the autumn of 1967 when Communist forces struck along the
Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) in the Central Highlands concentrated around Con Thien.
These attacks resulted in significant NVA losses in both experienced manpower and
equipment. Those battles at Loc Ninh, Song Be and Dak To, revealed that NVA forces
could not decisively engage U.S. ground forces because of the latter’s overwhelming
firepower and mobility. Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap altered the campaign plan by
shifting targets from American to ARVN units.9 On January 21, 1968, Phase II of the
Communist plan commenced with the attack on the large U.S. Marine airbase at Khe
Sanh. The Communist leaders’ intent was to replicate the 1954 victory against the
French at Dien Bien Phu by destroying an isolated U.S. outpost with two NVA
divisions.10 This would divert Allied attention away from coastal cities leaving them
more vulnerable to attack while eroding the American people’s confidence and creating a
public outcry to end the war. President Johnson demanded assurance from General
Westmoreland and the U.S. armed forces that Khe Sanh would not fall, creating the
conditions the North Vietnamese desired.
While the siege of Khe Sanh drew American attention and valuable air and
artillery assets to its defense and away from the major South Vietnamese cities, the
Communists launched their main offensive in the early morning hours of January 31.
The plan was to attack more than 100 cities and towns, thirty-six of forty-four provincial
capitals, five of six major cities especially, Saigon and Hue, with over 67,000 North
Vietnamese troops.11 During the Tet holiday cease-fire, Communist troops infiltrated
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men, dressed in civilian attire, and equipment into the cities to await the signal to act.
The attackers hoped their adversaries would be scattered and stretched thin in the face of
sudden assaults on every front, and thus unable to mass and maneuver their firepower.12
Many South Vietnamese troops were on holiday leave, so Communist forces initially
enjoyed widespread success.

However, within days of the initial assaults, U.S. and

ARVN forces had defeated nearly every attack, allowing General Westmoreland to
concentrate his effort in the I Corps Tactical Zone (see Map 1).
The Battle for Hue began in the late hours of January 30, 1968 with an initial
assault on outposts south of Hue. Intelligence reports from throughout the country
pointed to the strong presence of Communist forces and the scope of their plan. The
early morning assault on Hue on January 31 nonetheless met little resistance and resulted
in the capture of the Imperial Palace and seizure of the Citadel and strategic points
throughout Hue City – a success that reflected the detailed tactical planning that
Communist leaders had undertaken to secure their operational objectives. The battle that
ensued to recapture Hue marked the end of American resolve in South Vietnam. The
horrific urban fighting demonstrated a need for new tactics and techniques, requiring the
U.S. Marines and soldiers to become inventive and adaptive towards the North
Vietnamese attacks. It marked a significant shift in the nature of warfare from the rice
paddies and jungles of the Ia Drang Valley to the city streets.
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MAP 1 - I CORPS TACTICAL ZONE (ICTZ)13
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CHAPTER 2
BATTLE FOR HUE
Operation Hue City was an unplanned operation evolving from a contact made by a
reaction company on entering Hue City . . . . The nature of the terrain and the stubborn
‘hold at all cost’ tactics of the enemy forces introduced a new concept of warfare to the
Marines in Vietnam. - Colonel Stanley S. Hughes, Commanding Officer, 1st Marine
Regiment14
The bloodiest and most destructive battle of the Tet Offensive occurred in Hue,
the most venerated city in Vietnam. Located astride Highway 1, ten kilometers west of
the coast and a hundred kilometers south of the DMZ, Hue was the capital of Thua Thien
Province and South Vietnam’s third largest city, with a wartime population of 140,000
(see Map 2). It was the old imperial capital and served as the cultural and intellectual
center of Vietnam. Although sporadic mortar and rocket attacks occurred in the
surrounding areas, Hue itself remained relatively peaceful and secure prior to Tet in
1968; indeed, until then the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese treated it almost as an open
city. Nevertheless, Hue was on one of the principal land supply routes for the allied
forces occupying positions along the DMZ to the north. Hue also served as a major
unloading point for waterborne supplies brought inland on the river from Da Nang on the
coast.
Hue was really two cities divided by the Song Huong, or River of Perfume, which
flowed through the city, from the southwest to the northeast on its way to the South
China Sea. Two-thirds of the city’s population lived north of the river within the walls of
the Old City, or Citadel, a picturesque place of gardens, moats, and intricate stone buildings.
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MAP 2 – HUE CITY15
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The Citadel was an imposing fortress, begun in 1802 by Emperor Gia Long with the aid
of the French and modeled on Peking’s Forbidden City. Once the residence of the
Annamese emperors who ruled the central portion of present-day Vietnam, the Citadel
covered three square miles and included three concentric cities and a labyrinth of readily
defensible positions. Surrounded by a zigzagging moat, ninety-feet wide and up to
twelve feet deep, the Citadel was protected by an outer wall six meters high and up to
seventy-five meters thick that formed a square about 2,500 meters on each side. Three
sides were straight, while the fourth wall curved slightly to follow the contour of the
river. The walls, honeycombed with bunkers and tunnels constructed by the Japanese
when they occupied the city during World War II, created an almost impregnable
defense.
The Citadel contained block after block of row houses, parks, villas, shops,
various buildings, and an airstrip. Within the Citadel was another walled city, the
Imperial Palace compound, where the emperors had held court until 1883 when the
French returned to take control of Vietnam. Located at the south end of the Citadel, the
palace was essentially a square with twenty-feet high walls that measured 700 meters to a
side. The Citadel and the Imperial Palace were a “camera-toting tourist’s dream,” but
they would prove to be “a rifle-toting infantryman’s nightmare.”16
South of the river and linked to the Citadel by the six-span Nguyen Hoang Bridge,
over which Highway 1 passed, lay the modern portion of the city. This was about half
the size of the Citadel, and about a third of the city’s population resided there. The
southern half of Hue contained the hospital, the provincial prison, the Catholic cathedral
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and many of the city’s modern structures, including government administrative buildings,
the U.S. Consulate, Hue University, the city’s high school, and the newer residential
districts.
The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) 1st Infantry Division,
headquartered in Hue, had the majority of its forces in occupied areas along Highway 1,
from Hue north toward the DMZ. The division headquarters was located in the northwest
corner of the Citadel in a fortified compound protected by 6-to-8-foot high walls, topped
by barbed wire. The closest South Vietnamese unit was the 3rd ARVN Regiment with
three battalions, located seventeen kilometers northwest of Hue at the former French
army base, Post Kilometer 17 (PK17). A fourth ARVN battalion operated some miles
southwest of the city. The only combat element in the city itself was the division’s Hac
Bao Company, known as the “Black Panthers,” an elite all-volunteer unit that served as
the division reconnaissance and rapid reaction force. Security within the city was
primarily the responsibility of the National Police.
The only U.S. military presence in Hue when the battle began was the Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) compound, which housed 200 U.S. Army, U.S.
Marine Corps, and Australian officers and men who served as advisors to the 1st ARVN
Division. They maintained a lightly fortified compound on the eastern edge of the
modern part of the city south of the river about a block and a half south of the Nguyen
Hoang Bridge. The MACV compound was hardly more than it had been in its former
life: a hotel for transient advisors supported by some permanently billeted administrative
personnel.17
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The nearest U.S. combat base was at Phu Bai, eight miles south along Highway 1.
Phu Bai was a major U.S. Marine Corps command post and support facility that was
home of Task Force X-Ray (see Map 3), established as a forward headquarters of the
U.S. 1st Marine Division. The task force, commanded by Brigadier General Foster C.
“Frosty” LaHue, Assistant Commander of the 1st Marine Division, consisted of two
Marine regimental headquarters and three battalions -- the 5th Regiment with two
battalions and the 1st Regiment with one battalion. LaHue and most of the troops had
only arrived recently in the Phu Bai area, displacing from DaNang, and were still
becoming acquainted with the area of operations when the Communists launched the
attack on Hue.
In addition to the Marines, there were also U.S. Army units in the area. Two
brigades of the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division occupied positions over a wide area from Phu
Bai in the south to Landing Zone (LZ) Jane just south of Quang Tri in the north. The 1st
Brigade, 101st Airborne Division had recently been attached to the 1st Cavalry Division
and had just arrived at Camp Evans (located north along Highway 1 between Hue and
Quang Tri), coming north from its previous area of operations as part of a major shuffle
of forces into and out of the I Corps Tactical Zone. The road networks extending from
Phu Bai through Hue, PK 17, and Camp Evans were choked with elements from the 1st
Marine, 101st Airborne and 1st Cavalry Divisions.18
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MAP 3 - TASK FORCE X-RAY AT PHU BAI19
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Opposing the allied forces in the Hue region were 5,000 Communist troops, ten
battalions under the direct leadership of the commanding general of the Communist TriThien-Hue Military Region (encompassing Quang Tri and Thuan Thien provinces).20
These were highly trained North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units that had come south
either across the DMZ, or more likely, down the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Heavily armed with
AK47 assault rifles, RPD machineguns, and B-40 rocket propelled grenade launchers,
NVA forces prepared for the imminent encounter with U.S. forces. In addition, the NVA
forces had 107mm, 122mm, and 140mm free-flight rockets, 82mm and 120mm mortars,
recoilless rifles, and heavy machineguns. Six Viet Cong main force battalions, including
the 12th and Hue City Sapper Battalions joined the North Vietnamese units.21 A typical
main force VC infantry battalion consisted of 300-600 skilled veteran fighters. The VC
soldiers, armed similarly to the NVA, did not possess some of the heavier weapons.
During the course of the Battle for Hue, the total Communist force in and around the city
grew to twenty battalions when three additional infantry regiments relocated to the Hue
area from the Khe Sanh battlefield.
Before the Tet Offensive began, the Communists prepared extensive plans for the
attack on Hue, directed by General Tran Van Quang, commander of the B4 (Tri-ThienHue) Front. The plan (see Map 4) called for a division-size assault on the city, while
other forces isolated access to the city to preclude allied reinforcements. Quang and his
senior commanders believed that once the city’s populace realized the superiority of the
Communist troops, the people would immediately rise up to join forces with them against
the Americans and the South Vietnamese, driving them out of Hue. Possessing very
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MAP 4 - COMMUNIST ATTACK PLAN FOR HUE22
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detailed information on civil and military installations within the city, the Communist
planners divided Hue into four tactical areas and prepared a list of 314 targets within the
city.23 They planned to use more than 5,000 soldiers to assault the city. Communist
documents captured during and after the Tet offensive indicate that enemy troops
received intensive training in city street-fighting techniques before the offensive began.24
Extremely adept at combat in the jungles and rice paddies, NVA and VC soldiers
required additional training to prepare for the special requirements of fighting in urban
terrain. The training focused on individual and unit tasks including offensive tactics and
urban techniques and procedures - such as sapper actions, disguise and infiltration, raids
on mechanized forces, encirclement and isolation tactics, and mine attacks - to assist in
quickly capturing the city and defensive measures to help the Communists hold it once
they had seized it.
The enemy had carefully selected the time for the attack. Because of the Tet
holiday, the 1st ARVN Division defenders would be at reduced strength. In addition, bad
weather that traditionally accompanied the northeast monsoon season would hamper
aerial resupply operations and impede close air support, which would otherwise have
given the allied forces in Hue a considerable advantage.
The city’s defense against the impending attack hinged in large part on the
leadership of Brigadier General Ngo Quang Truong, commander of the 1st ARVN
Division, regarded by many U.S. advisors as one of the best senior commanders in the
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South Vietnamese armed forces.25 A 1954 graduate of the Dalat Military Academy, he
had earned his position through ability and combat leadership, not because of political
influence or bribery, as was the case with many of his ARVN peers.
On the morning of January 30, the beginning of the Tet holiday, Truong received
reports of enemy attacks on Da Nang, Nha Trang, Qui Nhon and other South Vietnamese
installations during the previous night. Sensing that something was up, he gathered his
division staff at the headquarters compound and put his troops on full alert. They were
not pleased with cancellation of their holiday leave, but Truong’s act prevented the
capture of his headquarters and provided him with a base of operations to conduct the
coming battle. Unfortunately, over half of his division was on holiday leave and absent
from Hue. Believing that the Communists would not attack the “open” city directly,
Truong positioned his available forces in defensive positions outside the urban area.
When the Communist attack came, therefore, the only regular ARVN troops in the city
were from the Hac Bao “Black Panther” reconnaissance company, which was guarding
the Tay Loc airstrip in the northeastern corner of the Citadel.
Unknown to Truong as he made preparations for whatever was to occur; there
was a clear indication that the NVA would attack Hue. On the same day that Truong put
his staff on full alert, a U.S. Army radio intercept unit at Phu Bai overheard Communist
orders calling for an imminent assault on Hue. Following standard procedure, the
intercept unit forwarded the message through normal channels. Making its way through
several command layers, the intercept and associated intelligence analysis did not make it
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to the Hue defenders until the city was already under attack.26 On the outskirts of the
city, Lieutenant Nguyen Thi Tan’s 1st ARVN Division Reconnaissance Company
patrolled to the west of Hue. His soldiers observed two enemy battalions passing through
their positions and immediately reported the contacts to the 1st ARVN Division
headquarters.27
Even as intelligence reports made their way slowly through channels, the Viet
Cong had already infiltrated the city. Wearing civilian garb, Communist troops mingled
with the throngs of people who had come to Hue for the Tet holiday. They easily
transported weapons and ammunition into the city in wagons, truck beds, and other
hiding places. In the early morning hours of January 31, the VC soldiers took up initial
positions within the city and prepared to link up with the NVA and VC assault troops. At
3:40 a.m., the Communists launched an intense rocket and mortar barrage from the
mountains to the west on both old and new sectors of the city. Following this barrage,
the assault troops began the attack. The VC infiltrators donned their uniforms, met their
comrades at the gates, and led them in the attack on key installations within the city. The
6th NVA Regiment, with two battalions of infantry and the 12th VC Sapper Battalion
launched the main attack from the southwest and moved quickly across the Perfume
River into the Citadel toward the ARVN 1st Division headquarters in the northeastern
corner. The 800th and 802nd Battalions of the 6th NVA Regiment rapidly overran most of
the Citadel, but Truong and his staff held the attackers off at the 1st ARVN Division
compound, while the Hac Bao Company managed a tentative hold on its position at the
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eastern end of the Tay Loc airfield. On several occasions, the 802nd Battalion came close
to penetrating the division compound, so Truong ordered the Black Panthers to withdraw
from the airfield to the compound to help strengthen his defenses. By daylight on
January 31, the 6th NVA Regiment controlled the entire Citadel, including the Imperial
Palace. The only exception was the 1st ARVN Division compound, which remained in
South Vietnamese hands. The 802nd NVA Battalion breached the ARVN defenses on
several occasions during the night, but each time the Black Panthers hurled them back.28
The situation was not much better for U.S. forces south of the river in the new
city. It could have been worse, but the North Vietnamese made a tactical error when they
launched the initial assault on the MACV compound. Rather than attack immediately on
the heels of the rocket and mortar barrage, they waited for approximately five minutes,
which gave the defenders an opportunity to mount a quick defense.
The 804th Battalion of the 4th NVA Regiment twice assaulted the compound, but
the allied defenders repelled their attackers each time by quickly assembling every man
armed with individual weapons. Specialist 4th Class Frank Doezma operated an exposed
machine gun position atop a twenty-foot wooden tower. His fire halted the first rush of
North Vietnamese sappers who tried to advance toward the compound walls to set satchel
charges, but he died from a B-40 rocket in an ensuing attack.29 The NVA troops then
stormed the compound gates where a group of Marines occupying a bunker met them.
The Marines held off the attackers for a brief period, but eventually the NVA
defeated the defenders with several B-40 rockets. The Marines’ sacrifice slowed the
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North Vietnamese attack and gave the Americans and their Australian comrades’
additional time to organize their defenses.30 After an intense firefight, the Communists
failed to take the compound, so they tried to reduce it with mortars and automatic
weapons fire from overlooking buildings. The defenders sought cover and waited for
reinforcements.
While the battle raged around the MACV compound, two VC battalions took over
the Thua Thien Province headquarters, police station, and other government buildings
south of the river. At the same time, the 810th NVA Battalion occupied blocking
positions on the southern edge of the city along Highway 1 to prevent reinforcement from
that direction. By dawn, the 4th NVA Regiment controlled all of Hue south of the river
except the MACV Compound.
Thus, in very short order, the Communists seized control of virtually all of Hue.
When the sun came up on the morning of January 31, nearly everyone in the city could
see the gold-starred, blue-and-red National Liberation Front flag flying high over the
Citadel. While the NVA and VC assault troops roamed the streets freely and
consolidated their gains, political officers began a reign of terror by rounding up South
Vietnamese and foreigners from prepared special target lists. VC officers marched
through the Citadel, reading out the names on the lists through loudspeakers, telling them
to report to the Government Delegate’s office building. Those who responded never
returned; their fate became known only after the U.S. and South Vietnamese forces
recaptured the Citadel and found nearly 3,000 civilians massacred and buried in shallow
mass graves.31
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As the battle erupted, other Communist forces struck in cities and towns from the
DMZ to the Ca Mau Peninsula in the south. The North Vietnamese quickly established
additional blocking positions to prevent Allied reinforcements from reaching the
beleaguered defenders. The 806th NVA Battalion blocked Highway 1 northwest of Hue,
while the 804th NVA and K4B Battalions took up positions in southern Hue. At the same
time, the 810th NVA Battalion dug in along Highway 1 south of Hue. Allied leaders had
their hands full all over the country and it proved difficult to assemble sufficient
uncommitted combat power to oust the Communists. Additionally, the repositioning of
U.S. and South Vietnamese forces to the west to support the action in and around Khe
Sanh further reduced the number of troops available in the entire northern region. This
situation had a major impact on the conduct of operations to retake Hue from the
Communists.
Brigadier General Truong, who maintained a tenuous hold on his own
headquarters compound, ordered his 3rd Regiment at PK17, reinforced with two airborne
battalions and an armored cavalry troop, to fight its way into the Citadel from their
positions northwest of the city. These forces encountered intense small arms and
automatic weapons fire as they neared the Citadel and did not reach Truong’s
headquarters until late in the afternoon of the 31st.
As Truong tried to consolidate his forces, another call for reinforcements went out
from the surrounded MACV compound inside the city. This plea for assistance was
almost lost in all the confusion caused by the simultaneous attacks occurring across the I
Corps Tactical Zone. Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, commander of South
Vietnamese forces in I Corps, and Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, III Marine
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Amphibious Force (MAF) commander, were not sure what exactly was happening inside
the city. The enemy strength and the scope of the Communist attack were less than clear
during the early hours of the battle, but the allied commanders realized that
reinforcements were necessary to expel the Communists from Hue. Accordingly,
Cushman ordered Task Force X-Ray to send reinforcements into Hue to relieve the
besieged MACV compound.
In response to III MAF directives, Brigadier General LaHue immediately directed
Company A, 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (A/1-1), to move up Highway 1 from Phu Bai by
truck to relieve the surrounded U.S. advisors. Rudely awakened from a much-needed
slumber, Captain Gordon D. Batcheller told his company to prepare for a new mission.
Given no real information, Batcheller remarked, “All I knew was ‘something was up.”32
LaHue had no idea that almost an entire division had seized the city. The initial report of
the attack on Truong’s headquarters and the MACV compound had led LaHue to believe
that only a small enemy force had penetrated the city as part of a local diversionary
attack, which is why he sent a lone company to contain the problem. Thus unaware of
what awaited him, Batcheller ordered his A/1-1 Marines into several hastily acquired
trucks and headed north along Highway 1, called “the Street Without Joy” because so
many Frenchmen had died there in the past.33
Enroute the column linked up with four M48 tanks from the 3rd Tank Battalion,
3rd Marine Division led by Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. LaMontagne. The combined
convoy ran into sniper fire almost immediately and had to stop several times to clear
buildings along their route of advance. When the convoy crossed the An Cuu Bridge that
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spanned the Phu Cam Canal into the southern part of the city, the Marines immediately
received withering crossfire from enemy automatic weapons and B-40 rockets that
seemed to come from every direction. The Marines advanced slowly against intense
enemy resistance, but accurate machine gun fire pinned them between the river and the
canal, just short of the MACV compound. Among the number of Marines wounded in
the initial assault was Captain Batcheller, which forced Gunnery Sergeant J.L. Canley to
assume command of the trapped company.
With his Company A pinned down, Lieutenant Colonel Marcus J. Gravel, the
battalion commander of 1/1 Marines, organized a hasty reaction force that included
himself, his operations officer, some other officers from his battalion command group,
and Company G, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (G/2-5), a unit from another battalion that had
just arrived in Phu Bai earlier that day.34 Gravel had never met Captain Charles L.
Meadows, the Company G commander, and he later said that the only planning he had
time to accomplish was to issue a terse order: “Get on the trucks!”35
With little information other than that their fellow Marines were pinned down, the
relief force moved along Highway 1, reinforced with two M42 Duster self-propelled
twin-40mm anti-aircraft guns. The force met little resistance along the way and linked up
with A/1-1 Marines, led by a slightly wounded Gunnery Sergeant Canley. With the aid
of the four tanks and two Dusters from D Battery, 1-44 Artillery, the combined force
fought its way to the MACV compound, breaking through to the beleaguered defenders at
about 1515. The cost, however, was high: ten Marines killed and thirty wounded.
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Having linked up with Colonel George Adkisson, MACV Advisory Team 3
commander, and the defenders of the MACV compound, Lieutenant Colonel Gravel
received new orders from Brigadier General LaHue, directing him to cross the Perfume
River with his wounded battalion and break through to the 1st ARVN Division
headquarters in the Citadel. Gravel protested that his “battalion” consisted of only two
companies, one of which was in bad shape, and that part of his force would remain
behind to assist with the defense of the MACV compound. Nevertheless, LaHue, who
still had not realized the full extent of the enemy situation in Hue, radioed back that
Gravel was to “Proceed.”36 This was the beginning of a series of intelligence failures by
Task Force X-Ray. It took several days for General LaHue’s staff to determine the extent
of the NVA resistance at a cost of dozens of Marines killed and many scores wounded.
Sending Gravel’s battered force to contend with the much stronger NVA and VC forces
north of the river would ultimately result in failure.
Leaving Company A/1-1 Marines behind to help with the defense of the MACV
compound, Gravel took Company G/2-5 Marines, reinforced with three of the original
M48 tanks and several others from the ARVN 7th Armored Cavalry Squadron, and
moved out to comply with LaHue’s orders. Leaving the tanks on the southern bank to
support by fire, Gravel and his Marines attempted to cross the Nguyen Hoang Bridge
leading into the Citadel.
As the first infantry squad, led by Lance Corporal Barney Barnes, started across
the bridge, it met with a withering hail of .51 caliber machine gun fire from a position at
the north end of the bridge. With ten of his men down, Captain Meadows set up a
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casualty collection point and directed the efforts to treat his fallen Marines. Lance
Corporal Lester A. Tully rushed forward and destroyed the machine gun nest with a
grenade. He later received the Silver Star for this heroic action and many Marines would
in the days to follow as the fierce urban conflict produced frequent displays of individual
heroism. Two platoons following Tully rushed over the bridge and established a hasty
defensive perimeter, paralleling the river along the Citadel’s southeast wall. They
immediately came under heavy fire from AK47 assault rifles, heavy automatic weapons,
B-40 rockets, and recoilless rifles from the walls of the Citadel. Lieutenant Colonel
Gravel arrived at the north bank of the bridge only to find several seriously wounded
Marines and NVA soldiers. Captain Meadows ordered his 1st platoon to continue
forward along the outer wall but they instantly encountered accurate and lethal automatic
weapons fire. Suffering additional casualties and no longer having the nerve to send his
men into harm’s way, Meadows gathered the remains of his shattered forced and returned
to the sliver of protection near the north wall of the Citadel.37 His assessment to Gravel
accurately reflected a well-entrenched and superior hostile force opposing the Marines.
Lieutenant Colonel Gravel determined that his “battalion” was greatly
outnumbered and decided to withdraw without permission. His battalion having suffered
significant casualties, Gravel called for vehicle support from Colonel Adkisson at the
MACV compound to assist in evacuating his wounded, but the harried MACV advisor
denied the request. Inadequate unity of command and fragile command and control
relationship caused several needless casualties and wasted precious time that the 1/1
Marines needed to withdraw their wounded and dead. Gravel then set out on foot back
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across the Nguyen Hoang Bridge, commandeered some abandoned Vietnamese civilian
vehicles and used them as makeshift ambulances. After three hours of intense fighting,
Company G/2-5 was able to pull back to the bridge and proceed to the safety of the
MACV compound. By 7:00 p.m., the 1/1 Marines had established a defensive position
near the MACV compound along a stretch of riverbank that included a park which they
rapidly transformed into a helicopter landing zone to begin evacuating the wounded. The
Marines’ attempt to force their way across the bridge had been costly. Captain Meadows
reported to Gravel the loss of 35 percent of his unit killed or wounded “going across that
one bridge and then getting back across the bridge.”38 A late night medical evacuation
(Medevac) attempt to remove some of the most seriously wounded Marines resulted in
the helicopter crews’ suffering four casualties of their own enroute to the makeshift
Landing Zone (LZ) near the MACV compound. Gravel learned much in the days to
follow, but nothing affected his thoughts more than how to save his Marines from another
day of senseless destruction. One costly lesson from that night’s action stood out clearly:
“Never again did he send his men into an unsecured area by way of city streets, which the
NVA obviously knew well enough to stake out.” After that horrific night, Gravel always
took a tank along to make new streets, right through buildings and walled compounds,
“The method destroyed a lot of Hue, but it saved lives.”39
Intelligence reports from all over the I Corps Tactical Zone created a vague notion
of an all-out offensive by the North Vietnamese; however, Task Force X-Ray staff’s
inability to piece together what was happening inside the walled fortress of Hue
exacerbated the situation. Despite Gravel’s detailed reports, Brigadier General LaHue
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and his intelligence officers still did not possess sound appreciation of what was
happening in Hue. “Task Force X-Ray was separated from Hue,” Keith Nolan aptly
summed up, “by eight miles and a wall of optimism, disbelief and misinformation.”
Remarks by General LaHue reflected the confusion at Marine headquarters. “Very
definitely we control the south side of the city,” he said in an interview, “I don’t think
they [i.e., the enemy] can sustain [the fight]. I know they can’t. I don’t think they have
any resupply capabilities, and once they use up what they brought in, they’re finished.”40
Unfortunately, the general was wrong on all counts. Besides the initial nine battalions
sent into Hue early on January 31, an additional five battalions infiltrated into the city,
increasing the NVA troop strength to over 6,000 regular with abundant supplies. NVA
resupply continued unabated during the early days and was not interrupted until February
23. This repeated gross underestimation of enemy strength in Hue resulted in insufficient
and piecemeal forces allocated to recapture the city.
With Brigadier General Truong and the 1st ARVN Division fully occupied in the
Citadel north of the river, Lieutenant Generals Lam and Cushman discussed how to
divide responsibility for the effort to retake Hue. They eventually agreed that ARVN
units would be responsible for clearing Communist forces from the Citadel and the rest of
Hue north of the river, while TF X-Ray would assume responsibility for the southern part
of the city.41 The Task Force gave responsibility for its part of the city proper to the 1st
Marine Regiment, and directed the 5th Marine Regiment secured areas outside the city.
The haphazard command and control situation resulted in what would be, in effect, three
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separate and distinct battles raging to recapture Hue - one south of the river, one north of
the river and one around the city.
In retaking Hue, Generals Lam and Cushman confronted a unique problem. The
ancient capital was sacred to the Vietnamese people, particularly so to the Buddhists.
The destruction of the city would result in political repercussions that neither the United
States nor the government of South Vietnam could afford. As a result, General Lam
imposed limitations on the use of artillery and close air support to minimize collateral
damage.42 Eventually General Lam lifted the restrictions when the allied forces realized
that both artillery and close air support were necessary to dislodge the enemy from the
city. However, the initial rules of engagement played a critical role in the Marines’
difficulties incurred in the early days of the battle.43
Having worked out the division of effort to retake Hue, General Cushman began
to send reinforcements into the Hue area in an attempt to separate Communist forces
inside the city from outside assistance. Needing mobility and flexibility to interdict
Communist infiltration and logistic routes, he ordered the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry
Division to block enemy approaches into the city from the north and west. On February
3, the brigade airlifted the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry (2/12 CAV) commanded by
Lieutenant Colonel Dick Sweet, into a LZ about 10 kilometers northwest of Hue on
Highway 1. The next days Sweet’s cavalry troopers had moved cross country from the
LZ and established a blocking position on a hill overlooking a valley about six kilometers

42
43

Murphy, Semper Fi – Vietnam, 195.
Nicholas Warr, Phase Line Green: The Battle for Hue, 1968 (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1997), 93.

29

west of the city. This position provided excellent observation of the main enemy routes
into and out of Hue.44
Simultaneously, the troopers of 5th Battalion, 7th Cavalry (5/7 CAV) conducted
search and clear operations along enemy routes west of Hue to destroy NVA and VC
reinforcements and cut enemy resupply. On February 7, 5/7 CAV initiated contact with
an entrenched North Vietnamese force and tried for the next 24 hours to expel the
communists. The enemy held its position, however, and stymied the Cavalry advance
with heavy volumes of automatic weapons and mortar fire.
On February 9, 3rd Brigade Headquarters ordered 5/7 CAV to fix the NVA forces
in place, and directed 2/12 CAV to attack northward from its position. The latter ran into
heavy resistance near the village of Thong Bon Ti, but continued to fight its way toward
5/7 CAV’s position. For the next ten days, the two cavalry battalions fought the
entrenched communists, who withstood repeated assaults. Despite the inability of the
cavalry troopers to expel the North Vietnamese, these actions at least partially blocked
the enemy’s movement, inhibited his participation in the battle raging in Hue, and
hampered his resupply efforts.45
For almost three weeks, U.S. cavalry units tried to hold off the reinforcement of
Hue by North Vietnamese troops from the NVA 24th, 29th, and 99th Regiments. Task
Force X-Ray reinforced the 3rd Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division on February 19 with the 2nd
Battalion, 501st Infantry (2/501st) from the 101st Airborne Division. The battalion
received the mission to seal access to the city from the south. That same day the 1st
Battalion, 7th Cavalry (1/7 Cav) deployed south to the Hue area after being relieved from
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its base defense mission at Camp Evans. While these U.S. Army units saw plenty of
heavy action in the outlying areas and contributed greatly to the eventual allied victory at
Hue, the fighting inside the city was to remain largely in the hands of South Vietnamese
troops and U.S. Marines. 46
As allied reinforcements began their movement into the area, ARVN soldiers and
U.S. Marines began preparing for counterattacks in their assigned areas. Making the task
more difficult was the weather, which took a turn for the worse on February 2 when the
temperature fell into the 50s and low clouds opened up with a cold, drenching rain. This
had significant impact on use of close air support, aerial medevac, and observed fires for
artillery support. The loss of these combat multipliers prior to the renewed assaults
created undue risk for the Marines as they sought to clear Communist forces from the
south side of Hue.47
As the Marines tended their wounds and soothed their pride, Lieutenant Colonel
Gravel reflected on their conduct. He realized that the last sustained urban fight U.S.
Marines had occurred during the reconquest of Seoul in September 1950. Although he
had served during the Korean War, he had not participated in that action. Captain
Meadows, though trained in fighting in built-up areas as a young lieutenant early in 1960,
had not experienced the ferocity of the NVA resistance in the heavily defended blocks of
houses and streets in Hue. Both men realized that their Marines lacked the required
training for the task that lay before them. No one in the battalion had ever fought in a
built-up area; the Marine Corps had virtually eliminated urban combat tactics from its
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wartime infantry-training program.48 The lack of training forced the Marines at Hue to
relearn in the heat of battle lost lessons of their esteemed past.
Ignoring his protests, TF X-Ray ordered Gravel’s 1-1 Marines to seize the Thua
Thien Province headquarters building and prison, six blocks west of the MACV
compound. In the early morning hours of February 1, Gravel launched a two-company
assault with the remnants of A/1-1 and G/2-5 supported by tanks, but the Marines
immediately ran into trouble. “We didn’t get a block away from the MACV compound
when we started getting sniper fire,” an M79 grenadier from Company G recalled. “We
got a tank . . . [and] went a block, turned right and received 57mm recoilless which put
out our tank.” The attack was thus “stopped cold” and the battalion fell back to its
original position near the MACV compound.49 The M48 tanks did not have the impact
that Gravel had hoped for; in fact, just the opposite occurred, as the tanks became
magnets for B-40 rockets fired to suppress the attacking Marines. The Marines broke off
the assault after advancing a single block towards their objective. Task Force X-Ray
finally answered Gravel’s pleas for assistance as the scope of the enemy’s offensive
became clearer.
By this time, General LaHue finally had realized that his intelligence officers had
vastly underrated the strength of the Communists south of the river. He therefore gave
Colonel Stanley S. Hughes, the new commander of the 1st Marine Regiment, overall
tactical control of U.S. forces in the southern part of the city. Hughes quickly promised
Gravel reinforcements and gave him the general mission of conducting “sweep and clear
operations . . . to destroy enemy forces, protect U.S. Nationals and restore that southern
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portion of the city to U.S. control.”50 Earlier on February 3, 1-1 Marines had received
operational control (OPCON) of Company F, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (F/2-5). Just the
day prior, F/2-5 was fighting enemy forces with its parent battalion when it received
word to pull from the 2/5 Marine defensive perimeter, truck to Phu Bai and prepare for
helolift to Hue. Despite the protests of its commanding officer, Captain Michael Downs,
F/2-5 moved to Hue with little knowledge of what was happening in Hue and what he
was supposed to do upon arrival.
Reporting to Lieutenant Colonel Gravel, Downs learned that he was to relieve a
MACV communications facility near the VC-surrounded U.S. consulate. The Marines
launched their attack, fighting most of the afternoon. Though Company F/2-5 Marines
had never fought in a town and the junior Marines lacked sufficient training to conduct
house-to-house combat, the veteran leaders knew very well how to feel their way into
hostile terrain. Despite their on-the-job training, F/2-5 Marines failed to reach the U.S.
Army signal troops, losing three Marines killed and thirteen wounded in the process.
Company F quickly learned “what the term mean streets really signifies.”51 During the
early evening hours, Gravel received orders to conduct a night attack to reach the Thua
Thien Provincial prison. When handed the task, Downs, in disbelief, pressed for further
information about the enemy situation along the six blocks his company would have to
transit, but received none. To make matters worse, he was restricted from using his
organic mortars due to the rules of engagements limiting artillery support within the city
and received only two M48 tanks. Concluding the mission was suicidal, Downs asked
permission from Gravel for permission to transmit his views to TF X-Ray headquarters.
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With Gravel’s consent, he sent a blunt message explaining “that the prison was six blocks
from MACV; that the NVA controlled all the streets on the southwest side of Highway 1;
that G/2-5 and F/2-5 had been unable to fight their way a half block southwest of the
highway in bloody, day-long attacks; and that no one at 1-1 or MACV even knew if there
were any prisoners left in the prison.”52 When headquarters received the message, it
promptly cancelled the night attack. At that point, Gravel’s exhausted marines
established night defensive positions near the MACV compound in order to rest and
resupply his battle weary “battalion.” During the night, he made plans to renew the
attack the next morning, but he was not to go alone, for reinforcements from Company H,
2nd Battalion, 5th Marines (H/2-5) had closed in on the MACV compound as well.
The next day, February 2, the Marines made some headway with the new
reinforcements. The 1/1 Marines finally relieved the MACV radio facility in the late
morning hours, and after an intense three-hour fight, reached the Hue University campus.
During the night, Communist sappers dropped the railroad bridge across the Perfume
River west of the city, but left untouched the bridge across the Phu Cam Canal. By 11:00
a.m., Company H/2-5, commanded by Captain Ronald G. Christmas, had crossed the
bridge over the Phu Cam canal in a convoy, accompanied by Army trucks equipped with
quad .50 caliber machine guns and two M50A1 ONTOS. The Ontos were tracked
vehicles armed with six 106mm recoilless rifles. As the convoy neared the MACV
compound, it came under intense enemy heavy machine gun and B-40 rocket fire.
Encouraged by the shouts from Captain Christmas, the convoy truck drivers floored their
accelerators and raced to the MACV compound. The marines, raked by blistering enemy
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fire, returned fire aiming straight up at Communist soldiers leaning out windows to drop
grenades onto the convoy.53 Luckily, the Marine units took minimal casualties during
their movement to the compound. H/2-5 Marines joined Gravel where the 1/1 Marines
had established a position near the MACV compound. The NVA and VC gunners
continued to pour machine gun and rocket fire into the positions occupied by Marines
who, by day’s end, had sustained thirty-six additional casualties, including two killed.54
On the afternoon of February 3, Brigadier General LaHue ordered Colonel
Hughes to move his command group into Hue, where he could more directly control the
battle. Accompanying Hughes in the convoy that departed for the city was Lieutenant
Colonel Ernest C. Cheatham, commander of 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, who had been
sitting frustrated in Phu Bai while three of his units – F, G, and H companies – fought in
Hue under Lieutenant Colonel Gravel’s control.55 Hughes quickly established his
command post in the MACV compound and took control of the situation. The forces at
his disposal included Cheatham’s three companies from 2-5 Marines and Gravel’s
depleted battalion consisting of Company A, 1-1 Marines and a provisional company
consisting of one platoon of Company B, 1-1 Marines and several dozen cooks and clerks
who had been sent to the front lines to fight.56 He directed Gravel to secure the left flank
with his one-and-a-half-company battalion to keep the main supply route open. He
ordered Cheatham and his three reattached companies to assume responsibility for the
attack south from the university toward the provincial headquarters, telling him to “attack
through the city and clean the NVA out.” When Cheatham hesitated waiting for
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additional guidance, the regimental commander, who, like everyone else going into Hue,
had only the sketchiest information, gruffly stated, “if you’re looking for any more, you
aren’t going to get it. Move out!”57 Another version of guidance Cheatham received
from Hughes was “to go dig the enemy out and to call on Regiment for any help he
thought he needed.”58 In essence, Hughes began to solve the command problems for the
Marines while reassuring his subordinate commanders that he would support any method
they felt necessary to conduct their assaults.
Cheatham’s plan called for his battalion to move west along the river from the
MACV compound. He would attack with Companies F and H in the lead and Company
G in reserve. Although the plan was simple, execution proved extremely difficult. From
the MACV compound to the confluence of the Perfume River and the Phu Cam Canal
was almost eleven blocks, each transformed by the enemy into a fortress that required
clearance building-by-building and room-by-room.
The Marines began their attack toward the treasury building and post office, but
they made very slow progress, not having yet devised workable tactics to deal with the
demands of urban terrain. As they tried to advance with the support of tanks, the
communists hit them with a withering array of mortar, rocket, machine gun, and small
arms fire from prepared positions in the buildings. According to Cheatham, his Marines
tried to take the treasury and postal buildings five or six different times.
The Marines just did not have enough men to deal with the enemy entrenched in
the buildings. The frontage for a company was about one block; with two companies
forward and one in reserve, this left an exposed left flank subject to enemy automatic
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weapons and rocket fire. By the evening of February 3, the Marines had made little
progress and were taking increasing casualties as they fought back and forth over the
same ground. The following morning, Colonel Hughes met with his battalion
commanders and ordered Cheatham to continue the attack. He told Gravel to continue to
secure Cheatham’s left flank with his battalion, which now had only one company left
after the previous day’s casualties. Before Gravel could move his Marines into position
to screen Cheatham’s attack, the 1-1 Marines had to secure the Joan of Arc School and
Church. They immediately ran into heavy enemy fire that forced the untrained Marines
to fight house-to-house. Eventually they secured the school, but continued to take
accurate fire from NVA and VC machine gunners and snipers in the church. Reluctantly,
Gravel gave the order to fire upon the church and the Marines pounded the building with
mortars and 106mm recoilless rifle fire, eventually killing or driving off the enemy. In
the ruins of the church, the Marines found two European priests, a Frenchman and a
Belgian, who were livid that the Marines had fired on the church. Gravel was sorry for
the destruction, but felt that he had had no choice in the matter.59
With Gravel’s 1/1 Marines moving into position to screen his left flank along the
Phu Cam Canal, Cheatham’s 2/5 Marines launched their attack at 0700 on February 4. It
took 24 hours of bitter fighting just to reach the treasury building. Attacking the rear of
the building after blasting holes through adjacent courtyard walls with 106mm recoilless
rifle fire, the Marines finally took the facility, but only after plastering it with 90mm tank
rounds, 106mm recoilless rifles, 81mm mortars, and finally CS gas, a riot-control agent.
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In the rapidly deteriorating weather, the Marines found themselves in a room-byroom, building-by-building struggle to clear an eleven by nine block area just south of the
river. This effort rapidly turned into a nightmare. Fighting in such close quarters against
an entrenched enemy was decidedly different from the Marines’ training and experience.
Accustomed to fighting in the sparsely populated countryside of the Central Highlands of
the I Tactical Corps Zone, nothing in their training prepared them for the type of warfare
demanded by this urban setting.60 Captain Christmas later remembered his apprehension
as his unit prepared to enter the battle for Hue. “I could feel a knot developing in my
stomach.” he said. “Not so much from fear--though a helluva lot of fear was there--but
because we were new to this type of situation. We were accustomed to jungles and open
rice fields, and now we would be fighting in a city, like it was Europe during World War
II. One of the beautiful things about the Marines is that they adapt quickly, but we were
going to take a number of casualties learning some basic lessons in this experience.”61
It was savage work -- house-to-house fighting through city streets--of a type
largely unseen by Americans since World War II. Ground gained in the fighting
measured in inches and each city block cost dearly with every alley, street corner,
window, and garden paid for in blood. Correspondents who moved forward with the
Marines reported the fighting as the most intense they had ever seen in South Vietnam.
The combat was relentless. Small groups of Marines moved doggedly from house
to house, assaulting enemy positions with whatever supporting fire was available,
blowing holes in walls with rocket launchers or recoilless rifles, then sending fire teams
and squads into the breach. Each structure had to be cleared room-by-room using M-16
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rifles and grenades. Taking advantage of Hue’s numerous courtyards and walled estates,
the NVA and VC ambushed the Marines every step of the way. Having had no training
in urban fighting, the Marines worked out the tactics and techniques on the spot.
One of the practical problems that the Marines encountered early was the lack of
sufficiently detailed maps. Originally, their only references were standard 1:50,000-scale
tactical maps that showed little of the city detail. Captain Meadows later remarked, “You
have to raid the local Texaco station to get your street map. That’s really what you
need.”62 Eventually, Lieutenant Colonels Cheatham and Gravel secured the necessary
maps and numbered the government and municipal buildings and prominent city features.
This permitted them to coordinate their efforts more closely and launch accurate fire
support for their Marines.
Making the problem even more difficult was the initial prohibition on using
artillery and close air support. The Marines had a vast arsenal of heavy weapons at their
disposal: 105mm, 155mm, and eight-inch howitzers, helicopter gun ships, close air
support from fighter-bombers, and naval gunfire from destroyers and cruisers with fiveinch, six-inch, and eight-inch guns standing just offshore. However, because of the initial
rules of engagement that sought to limit damage to the city, these resources were not
available to the Marines at the beginning of the battle.
Even after Lieutenant General Lam lifted the ban on the use of fire support south
of the river on February 3, the Marines could not depend on close air support or artillery
because of the compact quarters and the low-lying cloud cover. Lieutenant Colonel
Gravel later explained part of the difficulty. “Artillery in an area like that is not terribly
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effective because you can’t observe it well enough,” he said. “You lose the rounds in the
buildings, in the street . . . and you have a difficult time with perspective.”63
Additionally, the poor weather, which also greatly limited close air support, reduced the
effectiveness of artillery fire because with low clouds and fog obscuring the flashes, the
Marines had to adjust the rounds by sound.
The Marines had other firepower at their disposal. They used tanks to support
their advance, but found they were unwieldy in close quarters and drew antitank fire
nearly every time they advanced. They were much more enthusiastic about the
ONTOS with its six 106mm recoilless rifles used very effectively in the direct fire mode
to suppress enemy positions and to blow holes in the buildings. Despite their preference
for the 106mm recoilless rifle, the Marines made use of every weapon at their disposal in
order to dislodge the NVA and VC forces.64
Progress was slow, methodical, and costly. On February 6, Captain Christmas’
H/2-5 Marines took the Thua Thien province capitol building in a particularly bloody
battle. Using two tanks and two ONTOS, the Marines advanced against intense
automatic weapons fire, rockets, and mortars. Responding with the company’s mortars
and CS gas, the Marines finally overwhelmed the NVA defenders by mid-afternoon.
The province headquarters assumed a symbolic importance to both sides. A
National Liberation Front flag had flown from the flagpole in front of the headquarters
since the initial Communist takeover of the city. As a CBS television crew filmed the
event, the Marines tore down the enemy ensign and raised the Stars and Stripes. This
was a politically sensitive situation because the Marines should have turned over the
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provincial headquarters building to the ARVN and continued the fight. But Captain
Christmas was determined. “We’ve been looking at that damn North Vietnamese flag all
day, and now we’re going to take it down,” he told his gunnery sergeant.65 To Lieutenant
Colonel Cheatham, this proved to be the turning point of the battle for Hue. “When we
took the province headquarters, we broke their back,” he later explained. “That was a
rough one.”66
The provincial headquarters had served as the command post of the 4th NVA
Regiment. With its loss, the integrity of the North Vietnamese defenses south of the river
began to falter. The fighting was far from over, however, and the Marines expected the
final push to be more difficult. Despite the rapid adaptation of the Marines to street
fighting, it was not until February 11 that the 2/5 Marines reached the confluence of the
river and the canal. Two days later, the Marines crossed into the western suburbs of Hue,
aiming to link up with troopers of the 1st Cavalry and 101st Airborne Divisions, who were
moving in toward the city. By February 11, most of the city south of the river was in
American hands, but mopping up operations would take another twelve days as rockets
and mortar rounds continued to fall and isolated snipers harassed Marine patrols. Control
of the southern sector of the city returned to the South Vietnamese government. It had
been very costly for the Marines, who sustained 38 dead and 320 wounded. It had been
even more costly for the Communists: the bodies of over a thousand VC and NVA
soldiers laid strewn about the city south of the river.67
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While the Marines fought for the southern part of the city, the battle north of the
river continued to rage. Despite the efforts of U.S. units trying to seal off Hue from
outside reinforcement, Communist troops and supplies made it into the city from the west
and north, and even on boats coming down the river. On February 1, the 2nd ARVN
Airborne Battalion and the 7th ARVN Cavalry had recaptured the Tay Loc airfield inside
the Citadel, but only after suffering heavy casualties, including the death of the cavalry
squadron commander and losing twelve armored personnel carriers.
Later that day, U.S. Marine helicopters brought part of the 4th Battalion, 2nd
ARVN Regiment, from Dong Ha into the Citadel. Once on the ground, the ARVN
attempted to advance, but were unable to make much headway in rooting out the North
Vietnamese. By February 4, the ARVN advance north of the river had effectively stalled
among the houses, alleys, and narrow streets adjacent to the Citadel wall to the northwest
and southwest, leaving the Communists still in possession of the Imperial Palace and
most of the surrounding area.68
On the night of February 6-7, the NVA counterattacked and forced the ARVN
troops to pull back to the Tay Loc airfield. Simultaneously, the North Vietnamese rushed
additional reinforcements into the city. Brigadier General Truong responded by
redeploying his forces and ordering the 3rd ARVN Regiment to move into the Citadel to
take up positions around the division headquarters compound. By the evening of
February 7, Truong’s forces inside the Citadel included four airborne battalions, the
Black Panther Company, two armored cavalry squadrons, the 3rd ARVN Regiment, the
4th Battalion, 2nd ARVN Regiment, and a company from the 1st ARVN Regiment.69
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Despite the ARVN buildup inside the Citadel, Truong’s troops still failed to make any
headway against the dug-in North Vietnamese, who had burrowed deeply into the walls
and tightly packed buildings. All the while, NVA and VC forces seemed to be getting
stronger as reinforcements moved into the city. With his troops stalled by relentless
NVA fire, an embarrassed and frustrated Truong appealed to III MAF for help.70
On February 10, Lieutenant General Cushman sent a message to Brigadier
General LaHue directing him to move a Marine battalion to the Citadel. LaHue ordered
Major Robert Thompson’s 1st Battalion, 5th (1/5) Marines, to prepare for movement to
Hue (see Map 5). The next day, helicopters lifted two platoons of Company B/1-5
Marines into the ARVN headquarters complex. Twenty-four hours later, Company A/1-5
Marines, with five tanks attached, plus the missing platoon from Company B/1-5
Marines, made the journey by landing craft across the river from the MACV compound,
along the moat to the east of the Citadel and through a breach in the northeast wall. The
next day Company C/1-5 Marines joined the rest of the battalion. Once inside the
Citadel, the Marines relieved the 1st Vietnamese Airborne Task Force in the southeastern
section. Sequentially, two battalions of Vietnamese Marines moved into the southwest
corner of the Citadel with orders to sweep west. This buildup of allied forces inside the
Citadel put intense pressure on the Communist forces, but they stood their ground and
redoubled efforts to hold their positions.71
The following day, after conferring with South Vietnamese President Nguyen
Van Thieu, Lieutenant General Lam authorized allied forces to use whatever weapons
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were necessary to dislodge the enemy from the Citadel. Only the Imperial Palace
remained off limits for artillery and close air support.
The mission of the 1/5 Marines was to advance down the east wall of the Citadel
toward the river, with the Imperial Palace on their right. In the early morning hours of
February 13, Company A moved out under a bone-chilling rain, following the wall
toward a distinctive archway tower. Major Thompson expected to meet three ARVN
battalions as his lead company began its attack; however, as they neared the wall tower,
North Vietnamese troops opened up on the men with automatic weapons and rockets
from concealed positions that they had dug into the base of the tower. The thick masonry
of the construction protected the enemy defenders from all the fire brought to bear on
them. Within minutes, several Marines lay dying and thirty more were wounded,
including Captain John J. Bowe, Jr., the Company A commander. These troops, fresh
from operations in Phu Loc, just north of the Hai Van Pass, were unfamiliar with both the
situation and intense city street fighting.72
The 1/5 Marines defined their environment as “surrounded by houses, gardens,
stores, buildings two and three stories high, and paved roads littered with abandoned
vehicles, the riflemen felt out of their element.”73 The lack of experience in urban
fighting caused many Marine casualties and forced the 1/5 Marines to adopt new
techniques. Under heavy enemy fire, the Marines’ advance stalled; in the first assault on
the south wall, the Marines lost fifteen killed and forty wounded. Major Thompson
pulled Company A back and replaced them with Company C, flanked by Company B.
Once again, heavy small arms, machine gun, and rocket fire that seemed to come from
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every direction raked the Marines, but they managed to inch forward, using air strikes,
naval gunfire, and artillery support. The fighting proved even more savage than the battle
for the south bank. That night, Thompson requested artillery fire to help soften up the
area for the next day’s attack. He renewed the attack on the morning of February 14, but
his Marines made little headway against the entrenched North Vietnamese and VC. It
was not until the next day when Captain Myron C. Harrington brought Company D, 1st
Battalion, 5th Marines (D/1-5) to the battle area by boat that the enemy in the wall tower
capitulated, but only after six more Marines died and more than 50 wounded. That night,
the NVA retook the tower for a brief period, but Harrington personally led the
counterattack to return it to Allied control for good.
On the morning of February 16, Major Thompson’s 1/5 Marines attacked
southeast along the Citadel wall. From February 16-22, the battle raged back and forth
while close air support, artillery, and heavy weapons fire pounded the Citadel to rubble.
The bitter hand-to-hand fighting went on relentlessly. The Marines operated in a
defender’s paradise – row after row of single story, thick-walled masonry houses jammed
close together up against a solid wall riddled with spider-holes and other enemy fighting
positions. The Marines discovered that the North Vietnamese units in the Citadel
employed “better city-fighting tactics, improved the already formidable defenses, dug
trenches, built roadblocks and conducted counterattacks to regain redoubts which were
important to. . . their defensive scheme.”74 The young Marines charged into the
buildings, throwing grenades before them, clearing one room at a time. It was a battle
fought meter by meter, each enemy strongpoint reduced by fierce close-quarter fighting.
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MAP 5 – INSERTION OF 1/5 MARINES INTO THE CITADEL75
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No sooner was one position taken than the North Vietnamese opened up from another.
M48 tanks and ONTOS were available, but these tracked vehicles found it
extremely difficult to maneuver in the narrow streets and tight alleys of the Citadel.At
first, the 90mm tank guns were ineffective against the concrete and stone houses. The
tank rounds often ricocheted off the thick walls back toward the Marines. The Marine
tankers then switched to concrete-piercing fused shells that “resulted in excellent
penetration and walls were breached with two to four rounds.”76 From that point
forward, the tanks proved invaluable in assisting the infantry assault. One Marine
rifleman later stated, “If it had not been for the tanks, we could not have pushed through
that section of the city. They [the North Vietnamese] seemed to have bunkers
everywhere.”77
Because of the intense fighting, block after block of the once beautiful Citadel
laid in utter ruin. By the end of the battle, estimates tallied 10,000 houses either totally
destroyed or damaged, roughly 40 percent of the city.78 Many of the dead and wounded
lay trapped in the rubble of homes and courtyards. Enemy troops killed by the Marines
and South Vietnamese troops lay where they had fallen. “The bodies, bloated and vermin
infested, attracted rats and stray dogs,” one of the MACV advisors later wrote. “So,
because of public health concerns, details were formed to bury the bodies as quickly as
possible.”79 For those who fought in Hue, the memories of the stench and horrors of
rotting corpses and festering rats live forever.

76

Combat Operations After Action Report (Operation HUE CITY), 1st Marine Regiment, 80.
Shumlinson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 202.
78
Nolan, Battle for Hue, 183.
79
Smith, The Siege at Hue, 162.
77

47

By February 17, 1/5 Marines had suffered forty-seven killed and 240 wounded in
just five days of fighting. Constantly under fire the entire time, the Marines, numb with
fatigue, continued the fight despite having slept only in three- to four-hour snatches
during the battle and most not stopping to eat. The fighting was so intense that the
medics and doctors had a difficult time keeping up with the casualties. Because of the
mounting casualties, most Marine replacements brought directly into the battle became
casualties, many killed or wounded before their squad leaders could even learn their
names. Some replacements arrived in Hue directly upon completion of infantry training
at Camp Pendleton, California. The rapid rate of attrition was evident from the fact that
there were Marines who died in battle while still wearing their stateside fatigues and
boots.80
On February 18, with what was left of his completely exhausted battalion nearly
out of ammunition, Major Thompson chose to rest his troops in preparation for a renewal
of the attack. They needed time to clean their weapons, resupply their ammunition, tend
the walking wounded, and gird themselves for the next round of bitter fighting. The
following morning, Thompson and his Marines attacked toward the Imperial Palace.
They inched forward, paying dearly for every bit of ground taken. After another 24 hours
of bitter fighting, they secured the north wall of the palace but had virtually spent
themselves in doing so.81
As the U.S. Marines had fought their way slowly toward the Imperial Palace, the
South Vietnamese Marine task force entered the battle. At 9:00 a.m. on February 14, the
Vietnamese marines launched their attack from an area south of the 1st ARVN Division
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headquarters compound to the west. They were to make a left turning movement to take
the southwest sector of the Citadel, but did not get that far because they immediately ran
into heavy resistance from strong enemy forces as they engaged in intense house-tohouse fighting. During the next two days, the South Vietnamese advanced fewer than
400 meters. To the north of the Vietnamese Marines, the 3rd ARVN Infantry Regiment in
the northwest sector of the Citadel was having problems of its own and making little
progress. On the 14th, enemy forces broke out of their salient west of the Tay Loc airfield
and cut off the 1st Battalion, 3rd ARVN Regiment in the western corner of the Citadel. It
would take two days for the ARVN to break the encirclement, and then only after bitter
fighting and heavy casualties.82
The NVA experienced problems as well. On the night of February 14, a U.S.
Marine forward observer with ARVN troops inside the Citadel, monitoring enemy radio
frequencies, learned that the NVA was planning a battalion-size attack with
reinforcements through the west gate of the Citadel. He called in 155mm howitzers and
all available naval gunfire on preplanned targets around the west gate and the moat bridge
leading to it, later reporting that he had heard “screaming on the radio” monitoring the
NVA net.83 Subsequent intelligence, confirmed by additional radio intercepts, indicated
that the artillery and naval gunfire had caught the North Vietnamese battalion coming
across the moat bridge, killing a high-ranking North Vietnamese officer and a large
number of fresh troops.
Shortly after this incident, U.S. intelligence determined that the NVA and VC
were staging out of a base camp eighteen kilometers west of the city and that

82
83

Hammel, Fire in the Streets, 278.
Shumlinson, U.S. Marines in Vietnam, 204-205.

49

reinforcements from that area were entering the Citadel using the west gate.
Additionally, intelligence identified a new enemy battalion west of the city and a new
regimental headquarters with at least one battalion two kilometers north of the city.
Acting on this information, the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division ordered 2/12 CAV to launch
coordinated assaults on the city from their blocking positions to the west. On February
21, 1st Cavalry troopers attacked and were able to seal off the western wall of the fortress,
thus depriving the North Vietnamese of incoming supplies and reinforcements and
precipitating a rapid deterioration of the enemy’s strength inside the Citadel. The North
Vietnamese were now fighting a rear guard action, but still fought for every inch of
ground and continued to throw replacements into the fight.
As elements of the 1st CAV advanced toward Hue from the west and action
continued in the Citadel, fire support coordination became a major concern. On February
21, Brigadier General Oscar E. Davis, one of the two assistant division commanders for
the 1st Cavalry Division, flew into the Citadel to assume overall control of the situation in
order to serve as the area’s fire support coordinator. He established his headquarters
alongside Brigadier General Truong in the 1st ARVN Division headquarters compound.84
For the final assault on the Imperial Palace itself, a fresh unit, Captain John D.
Niotis’ Company L, 1st Battalion, 5th Marines airlifted into the Citadel. By February 22,
the Communists held only the southwestern corner of the Citadel. Niotis led his Marines
along the wall to breach the outer perimeter of the palace. Once inside, they faced
devastating fire from the entrenched enemy, which forced them to pull back. While the

84

Nolan, Battle for Hue, 140.

50

Marines prepared for the next assault on the Imperial City, Allied leaders decided that it
would be politically expedient to have the Palace liberated by the South Vietnamese.
Consequently, on the night of February 23-24, the 2nd Battalion, 3rd ARVN Regiment
launched a surprise attack westward along the wall from the southeastern section of the
Citadel. The North Vietnamese, initially caught off guard by the attack, recovered
quickly and raked the advancing ARVN forces with lethal machine gun and small arms
fire. A savage battle ensued but the South Vietnamese pressed the attack. The
Communists, deprived of their supply centers to the west by the link-up between the 1st
Cavalry Division and 2-5 Marines, fell back. Included in the ground gained by the South
Vietnamese attack was the plot upon which stood the Citadel flagpole. At dawn on the
24th, the South Vietnamese flag replaced the National Liberation Front (NLF) banner that
had flown from the Citadel flagpole for 25 days.85 Later that day, the 1st ARVN Division
reached the outer walls of the Citadel, where it linked up with elements of the 1st Cavalry
Division. The VC and NVA troops abandoned their positions and fled westward to
sanctuaries in Laos as the allied forces quickly overran the last Communist strongholds.
On March 2, 1968, General Cushman declared the Battle for Hue officially over.
It had been a bitter ordeal. The relief of Hue was the longest sustained infantry battle the
war had seen to that point. The losses were extremely high. In twenty-five days of
combat, ARVN forces lost 384 killed and more than 1,800 wounded, plus thirty missing
in action. The U.S. Marines suffered 147 dead and 857 wounded; for the U.S. Army, the
figures were seventy-four dead and 507 wounded. The allies estimated that they killed
over 5,000 Communists killed in the city and 3,000 in the surrounding area.86
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Although the Allied command tried to limit damage to the city by relying on
extremely accurate 8-inch howitzer and naval gunfire, the house-to-house fighting took
its toll, and much of the once beautiful city lay in rubble. The twenty-five days of
fighting to retake Hue destroyed 40 percent of the city, and 116,000 civilians out of a preTet population of 140,000 became homeless.87 Aside from the battle damage, the civilian
population suffered terrible losses from the communist attackers, officials reporting 5,800
civilians killed or missing. After the battle was over, South Vietnamese authorities
discovered that Viet Cong death squads had systematically eliminated South Vietnamese
government leaders and employees. They found nearly 3,000 corpses in mass graves
surrounding the city – most shot, bludgeoned to death, or buried alive, almost all with
their hands tied behind their backs.88 The victims included soldiers, civil servants,
merchants, clergymen, schoolteachers, intellectuals, and foreigners. Investigations
revealed that the VC murdered many other missing South Vietnamese and NVA during
the battle, or as Communist forces withdrew from the Citadel. The fighting had been
intense and bloody, but in the end, the allies had ejected the Communists and recaptured
the city.
The Battle for Hue remains worthy of further analysis in order to contemplate the
complexities and requirements for urban combat operations. It was a bloody affair
resulting in a severe casualty toll for various reasons, not the least of which were
intelligence failures and lack of centralized command and control. It was only through
the valor of individual Marines and soldiers, both American and South Vietnamese, that
the allies prevailed against a determined enemy under combat conditions in an urban
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environment that far exceeded anything that any of them had previously experienced.
Ironically, the victory at Hue proved irrelevant in the end. Despite the overwhelming
tactical victory achieved by the allies in the city and on the other battlefields throughout
South Vietnam, the Tet Offensive proved to be a strategic defeat for the United States.
U.S. public opinion, affected in large part by the media coverage of the early days of the
offensive, began to shift away from support for the war. On March 31, 1968, the full
impact of the Tet offensive became clear when President Johnson announced a halt of all
bombing of North Vietnam above the 20th parallel and gave notice that he would not seek
reelection to a second term in the White House. The Communists won a great strategic
victory; Plan TCK-TKN had achieved what General Giap set out to accomplish. In doing
so, the NVA lost an estimated 30,000 fighters, and the Viet Cong would never recover.
Nevertheless, the Tet Offensive resulted in a change in U.S. policy in Vietnam, and the
United States soon began its long disengagement from the war.89
Despite the outcome of the war, the Battle of Hue remains a classic study in urban
warfare that clearly demonstrates not only the rigors and demands of fighting in a builtup area, but also the valor and fortitude demanded of the soldiers who are to fight in such
situations. The U.S. Marines and South Vietnamese soldiers retook the city from the
Communists and paid for their effort in blood; many of the lessons they learned the hard
way are just as valid for urban fighting today as they were in 1968.
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CHAPTER 3
LESSONS LEARNED

The Marines of the Chosin Reservoir, of Hue City, and of countless other battles through
the years did not wait to be reminded of their individual responsibilities. They behaved as
Marines always have, and as we expect today’s Marines and those of the future to behave
– with courage, aggressiveness, and with resolve. The future battlefields on which
Marines fight will be increasingly hostile, lethal, and chaotic. Our success will hinge, as
it always has, on the leadership of our junior Marines. We must ensure that they are
prepared to lead. - General Charles C. Krulak, USMC (Ret.)90
The Battle for Hue remains one of the best battlefields to examine the challenges
and complexities of urban operations. Combat operations in and around Hue highlight
several weaknesses in the preparation of U.S. armed forces for urban combat. This study
reveals some of the more difficult challenges faced by American armed forces during the
battle, most of which remain a challenge today as well. The key factors that contributed
to the challenges faced include intelligence and situational understanding, fighting in
built-up areas (FIBUA) training, use of enabling systems and combat multipliers,
logistical resupply, casualty evacuation and medical support, command and control, rules
of engagement, and refugee control.
Lack of intelligence played a crucial role in the initial developments and course of
action taken to recapture Hue. As the battle unfolded, there were several key indicators
throughout South Vietnam that pointed toward an all-out effort by the North Vietnamese
army. The first came in September 1967 when Robert Brewer, senior U.S. intelligence
advisor assigned to Quang Tri Provincial Headquarters, uncovered a Communist agent
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and doubled him back onto his superiors.91 Intelligence reports analyzed throughout the
autumn of 1967 showed numerous indicators that North Vietnam planned a significant
change in the conduct of the war. The evaluation of the data pointed to nationwide
attacks on cities throughout South Vietnam; however, U.S. military intelligence
discounted the possibility that North Vietnam was willing to pay the high cost in men and
equipment to launch such an attack. Don Oberdorfer quotes a military intelligence
officer, “if we’d gotten the whole battle plan, it wouldn’t have been believed. It wouldn’t
have been credible to us.”92 Clearly, the intelligence system completely failed to believe
all the evidence pointing to nationwide attacks as imminent. At the tactical level around
Hue, several reports days prior to the attack revealed the North Vietnamese intentions.
Even when there were attack signals, movement of NVA units, supplies, and equipment
and an uncovered supply base six kilometers west of Hue, the 1st Marine Division
headquarters at Phu Bai remain unconvinced that an attack on the Hue city proper was
imminent. The data was enough for General LaHue to deploy patrols around the city.
Unfortunately, NVA sappers and infantry had already infiltrated the city during pre-Tet
holiday preparations. Brigadier General Truong made a wise assessment from reports of
January 29 and recalled his 1st ARVN division staff and cancelled holiday leaves, but this
proved too little and too late. Once the attack was launched, the volume and variety of
reports prevented the careful analysis necessary to gain an appreciation of the attack’s
scale. The intelligence system failed to provide the Marines with a situational
understanding of the enemy’s strength and intentions.
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The first Marine reinforcements deploying to Hue did not receive the initial
intelligence reports, a lapse that resulted in numerous casualties of unprepared Marines.
Captain Batcheller, Company A/1-1 Marines, had only sketchy details of enemy activity
when he received the mission on January 31 of linking up with MACV headquarters. As
the A/1-1 Marines approached Hue from Phu Bai, they learned from members of a
Marine Combat Action Patrol (CAP) “that local Vietnamese had reported numerous
enemy units moving in a northerly direction. The CAP was unable to confirm the
“civilian reports about beaucoup VC.”93 When Batcheller’s unit moved into southern
Hue, the enemy attacked from every direction and the Marines immediately took
substantial casualties which affected their ability to link-up with the MACV headquarters.
Company G/ 2-5 Marines, commanded by Captain Chuck Meadows, attached to 1/1
Marines, was ordered to move into Hue and link up with the 1st ARVN Division
Command Post (CP) in the Citadel and escort Brigadier General Truong back to Phu Bai.
Meadows, thinking it was to be a routine mission, told his men to leave their packs
behind. That order had significant consequences later when the G/2-5 Marines remained
in Hue for the duration of the fight without necessary individual equipment. The lack of
intelligence proved deadly time and again for the Marines during the first days of the
fighting. It degraded their effectiveness to join in the counterattack on Hue since they
were unclear as to the enemy’s strength in the city. Allied commanders, not knowing the
enemy’s disposition, reinforced the beleaguered defenders gradually, increasing the
number of casualties inflicted by numerically superior and entrenched NVA soldiers.
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The intelligence failure inhibited the allies’ ability to conduct target analysis.
Knowledge of the enemy’s strength and locations are crucial to effective plan
development and fire support. Captain Meadows, during his assault, did not even have a
map of the city. During his company’s movement toward the MACV compound, he
stumbled into a Texaco gas station where he found tourist maps with all the major
buildings listed and numbered. The crude but effective map provided the allied forces a
means to coordinate their attacks, to analyze intelligence reports and match which
buildings the NVA forces occupied, and commence their assaults.94 Simple intelligence
failures like these caused a disjointed effort to recapture the city.
U.S. forces at Hue lacked adequate training in what doctrine at the time labeled
“Fighting in Built-Up Areas (FIBUA).” Stateside training of new recruits came from the
drill instructors’ experiences in the jungles of Vietnam, and the veterans at Huealso had
seen combat only in jungles or rice paddies. As a result, the Marines assaulting Hue on
January 31 faced an entirely new situation and during the first three days of combat
underwent fast on-the-job training in the art of house-to-house fighting. They learned
through trial and error often resulting in numerous casualties. The Marines devised ways
to destroy an entrenched enemy who had ample time to prepare fortified positions with
interlocking fires of machine guns. The lack of training was so prevalent that Lieutenant
Colonel Cheatham, 2-5 Marines battalion commander, had to dig through the 5th Marines
Regimental headquarters to find manuals on combat in built-up areas. The two manuals
he found, Combat in Built-Up Areas and Attack on a Fortified Position highlighted what
would become the Marines’ assault plan. It boiled down to the best way to fight through
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a city was to gas the enemy, blow things up, and then clear out the ruins.95 The Marines
experimented with various techniques but the preferred method to clear a building in the
house-to-house fighting that ensued was with an eight-man team.

Four men covered the

exits of a building while the other four conducted the assault. The assault force blasted a
hole through a wall, window, or door, tossed in CS and/or fragmentation grenades and
then cleared the room or building. The outside force killed any NVA or VC forces trying
to escape. After successful clearance, the team would swap responsibilities and move to
the next building. “We hope to kill them inside or flush them out the back for the four
men watching the exits,” Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham explained. “Then, taking the
next building, two other men rush the front. It sounds simple but the timing has to be just
as good as a football play.”96 On February 3, Cheatham used this method to clear
southern Hue with Companies F and H, 2-5 Marines. Each company assigned a platoon
to suppress a target building, while a second platoon launched the assault. A third
platoon remained in reserve to assist when needed.97 Although the tactics were primitive,
they were effective. This methodical approach to rooting out an entrenched enemy
caused devastating damage or destruction to almost every building in Hue by the battle’s
end.
Tied to these tactics used to clear out buildings were the enabling systems and
combat multipliers. The Marines quickly learned that heavy weapons such as tanks,
recoilless rifles, Light Anti-Armor Weapons (LAAW), and 3.5 inch rocket launchers
were absolutely essential to create the shock effect and punching capacity needed to fire
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and maneuver on the city streets. Going through other buildings often required heavy
weapons to blast their way through to facilitate the assault and seize target buildings and
objectives. The Marines used a variety of man-portable rocket launchers to blast through
buildings and rooms. They scrounged up World War II vintage 3.5-inch bazookas and
M72 LAAWs to knock holes into walls or destroy bunkers.98

The Marines 3rd Tank

Battalion’s M48 main battle tanks proved a highly effective support platform to punch
gaps into compound walls, destroy bunkers, and provide cover for Marines. The 106mm
recoilless rifles, either mounted on the tracked M50A1 Ontos or the dismounted, crewserved variant, proved indispensable in house-to-house fighting. These heavy weapons
were also extremely useful for providing suppressive fire and as counter-sniper weapons
protecting Marines from devastating sniper fire from concealed NVA.
Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham ordered his men to search for any weapon that
would facilitate the urban fight he envisioned. Even obsolescent weapons were
unearthed, such as his battalion’s flame-throwers, which proved useful in burning out
bunkers and sniper positions, and in clearing rooms.99 His men took rucksacks full of C4
plastic explosives that were invaluable for destroying doors, bunkers and whole
buildings. His intent was to use everything in the Marines’ arsenal to maximum their
options to excavate NVA soldiers while minimizing his own casualties.
The Marines used riot control agents, such as smoke and tear gas, as effective
weapons to force enemy troops from buildings, their bunkers and spider holes. Thinking
of what he had read, Cheatham ordered his men to take every available gas mask from
Phu Bai because he knew they would be necessary to root out the enemy. During the

98
99

Command Chronology (San Francisco: Headquarters, 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, 1968), 13.
Hammel, Fire in the Streets, 135.

59

assault on the treasury building in southern Hue by 2/5 Marines, they had tried using
smoke grenades, but this proved ineffective due to stiff winds blowing off the Perfume
River. Major Ralph Salvati, executive officer of 2/5 Marines, recalled seeing E8 CS
launchers stacked against the wall of the MACV compound. The two-feet high launcher
could hurl as many as sixty-four 35mm tear gas capsules up to 250 meters. The E8
launcher could blanket an entire area so that the gas would saturate every room and
bunker. The NVA soldiers, fighting without masks, were forced to surface and then cut
down by the waiting Marines.100 The Marines used the CS launcher with great effect
throughout the remainder of the battle.
Smoke also proved useful in identifying NVA positions and to cover the Marines’
movements. Captain Ron Christmas, commander of Company H, 2-5 Marines, noticed
that the Communist troops would open fire when they saw smoke on the assumption that
Marines were shifting positions. “Our reaction was to throw smoke grenades into the
street to draw fire,” he later wrote. “We then pinpointed the fire and used our direct fire
weapons to suppress the enemy’s fire. We usually moved under the cover of the smoke
and dust caused by the direct fire weapons.”101
Logistical resupply became a critical factor in the Marines’ success to recapture
Hue. In the initial reinforcement of the city, many Marines went in thinking they would
be home that evening after a quick mission and so left most of their supplies and
ammunition back at the 1st Marine Division base at Phu Bai. As the battle progressed in
the first seventy-two hours, the Marines quickly realized that this was to be a drawn-out
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battle that would require vast amounts of ammunition. Until February 4 they received all
supplies via truck convoy and helicopter from Phu Bai, but then NVA sappers destroyed
the An Tu Bridge over the Perfume River. This forced the Marines to use the Landing
Craft, Utility (LCU) ramp at Hue City to get supplies forward to the troops.
The quickest yet more dangerous way to resupply was via helicopter. During the
first several days of the battle, resupply by air was sporadic at best due to weather
conditions, so the majority of supplies for the 1st Marine Regiment came by LCU. As
weather conditions improved, heliborne logistical support was exceptional. The Marines
ferried in ammunition and food then removed their most critically wounded to hospitals
established at Phu Bai. They learned that helicopter logistical support proved to be the
crucial factor that facilitated continuous operations in Hue.102
At the tactical level, resupply proved very difficult. The expenditure rate of small
arms ammunition especially 5.56mm rounds for the M-16 rifle, 60mm and 81mm mortar
rounds, 7.62mm linked rounds for the M60 machine gun, was ten times the normal rate of
expenditure. Supplies had to be ferried from the Logistical Support Area (LSA)
established at the LCU ramp to the Marines fighting in and around Hue via air. The
Marines established small Landing Zones (LZ) to quickly bring in supplies and remove
their wounded. Since there were limited trucks to haul ammunition around southern half
of Hue, most ammunition delivered arrived on heavy weapon platforms to platoon and
company command posts and then redistributed to the individual Marines. This proved
dangerous since it exposed these logistic convoys to devastating enemy B-40 rocket fire.
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Once the Marines secured the buildings and areas around the LCU ramp and MACV
compound, supplies moved to the forward companies for distribution.103 Although
resupply was difficult, there were very few shortages because of the constant logistical
flow from DaNang to Hue.
The nature and intensity of the house-to-house fighting produced an enormous
amount of casualties in a short amount of time. Due to inclement weather and therefore
reduced aerial operations, it became apparent that forward medical facilities were
required. Each battalion established its forward aid stations within its area of operations
to provide immediate emergency care and assess evacuation requirements. The 1st
Marine Regiment established a regimental aid station at the MACV compound with eight
medical officer and medics. The function of the forward regimental aid station was to
“(1) provide definitive emergency care and resuscitation of casualties, (2) provide control
and coordination of all casualty evacuations, (3) provide a clearing house for the killedin-actions (KIAs) in order to establish definite identification as soon as possible, and (4)
to serve as the Battalion Aid Station (BAS) for 1-1 Marines, who did not establish a
forward BAS.”104

Aid stations were within two to three minutes of the forward edge of

combat. Navy and Marine corpsmen and Army medics displayed valorous heroism to
save the lives of their fallen comrades. Under what was often intense enemy fire,
medical personnel treated and evacuated Marines right at the front line of combat, which
proved to be the difference in the life and death for many of the wounded. The Marines
used trucks, mechanical mules, and any available transportation to carry the wounded
back to the aid stations. From there, Marine and Army helicopters evacuated the
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critically wounded to hospitals at Phu Bai or on hospital ships, if warranted. During the
Battle for Hue, if a Marine reached an aid station alive, his chances of survival were
nearly 100 percent.105
Command and control raised a number of challenges for the Allied forces right
from the beginning of the battle. The lack of an overall commander for the battle
facilitated a disjointed effort to recapture Hue. On the evening of January 31, Lieutenant
General Hoang Xuan Lam, I ARVN Corps commander and Lieutenant General Robert
Cushman, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) commander, conferred to work out
operations in and around Hue. They agreed that Communist forces to defeat the
Communist forces by separate but broadly coordinated effort by their local subordinate
commands, Brigadier General Truong’s 1st ARVN Division and Brigadier General Foster
LaHue’s Task Force (TF) X-Ray.106

The boundary between the two commands was the

Perfume River, with the 1st ARVN Division responsible for clearing Communist forces
north of the river including the Citadel and TF X-Ray responsible south of the river
focused on the “New City.” The separate efforts between the ARVN and U.S. Marines
led to a lack of coordination and unity of effort that hampered city’s recapture. This
command arrangement remained in effect throughout most of the battle. U.S. Marines
reported to TF X-Ray at Phu Bai; ARVN forces received their orders from General
Truong’s 1st ARVN headquarters, and U.S. Army forces reported to Major General Jack
Colson’s 1st Cavalry Division. These forces conducted three simultaneous but separate
operations to relieve Hue in complete isolation from each other. On February 21,
Brigadier General Oscar E. Davis assumed overall command of U.S. forces fighting in
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Hue. His dual mission was to coordinate allied efforts and serve as fire support
coordinator; however, most of the fighting was over except for that surrounding the
Imperial Palace.107 The lack of an overall commander at the outset to plan, coordinate,
and execute the allies’ response negated unity of effort and caused significant problems
with command and control and deconfliction of unit attacks.
Without an overall tactical commander, no one was responsible for the conduct of
the battle. There was no one to develop an overall strategy, establish priorities of effort,
deconflict fire support requests for artillery and close air support, coordinate logistical
support, or hold accountable should the operation prove a disaster. U.S. forces scrambled
to take care of their own separate force, Marines and soldiers, while ARVN forces
received nothing from the U.S. commands and virtually no support from their own. The
command relationship almost guaranteed difficulty in achieving any meaningful unity of
effort.
The command and control situation created other challenges as well.
Coordination to isolate the city from outside Communist reinforcement proved difficult
while the Marines and ARVN forces cleared Hue City proper. The Communists’ plan
called for the isolation of the city so they could have unimpeded resupply and
reinforcement routes into and out of Hue. They were able to replenish their ranks even as
the fighting intensified and after they began to take increasing numbers of casualties.
ARVN and U.S. headquarters realized too late the scale of Communist operations around
Hue and not until February 3 did they send significant allied forces to isolate and destroy
Communist troops protecting infiltration routes and approaches into Hue. When the
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elements of the 1st Cavalry Division and 101st Airborne Division effectively sealed the
city from the northwest to the south of Hue on February 21, it had a decisive impact on
the battle inside the city.108 There was a significant decrease in NVA effort once the 1st
Cavalry Division and Marines cut all supply routes; the battle was over within a week.
The allied force might have achieved this earlier had there been a single commander to
synchronize better the efforts of the units outside the city with those fighting inside the
city.
Artillery and close air support to assist ground forces played a critical role in the
outcome of the battle. Hampered by inclement weather and stifling rules of engagement,
the Marines had to develop techniques to root out an entrenched enemy in a heavy urban
environment without the artillery and CAS that they were so accustomed to having at
their disposal. The rules of engagement initially agreed upon by Generals Lam and
Cushman limited the use of artillery and close air support to minimize the damage to the
historic and symbolic city. When Gravel sent Company G/2-5 Marines to link up with
the 1st ARVN Division Command Post (CP) in the Citadel, they could not use their
mortars or receive artillery support. Company G crossed the Nguyen Hoang Bridge
under continuous fire from the ramparts of the Citadel walls by well-placed NVA
machine gun fire. Artillery and CAS could have suppressed enemy fire while the
Marines conducted the assault. The Marines had five men killed and forty-five wounded,
almost 35 percent of the company.109 On February 11, while Gravel was establishing his
battalion command post and his soldiers were participating in a Mass service, the NVA
rained 120mm rockets into the Citadel. The rockets fell short and landed on the
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archbishop’s seminary where Vietnamese children sought shelter. As Gravel supervised
the evacuation of twenty dead and forty injured children, he thought, “Charlie didn’t have
Rules of Engagement. They didn’t care whom they killed.”110 The Marines continued to
suffer numerous casualties clearing the NVA from house-to-house. Lack of artillery and
close air support made it extremely difficult, particularly during the early days of the
battle, for the Marines to dig the North Vietnamese out of prepared positions inside the
city. Lieutenant General Lam lifted these restrictions on February 13 when Allied
headquarters argued successfully that adhering to that standing order was causing
unacceptable casualties. ARVN and U.S. forces inside the Citadel were very pleased
with the easing of the fire support restrictions. A determined enemy engaged the Marines
and ARVN forces continuously and the impact of fire support enabled them to dig out the
entrenched Communist soldiers. Nicholas Warr, a platoon leader in Charlie Company, 15 Marines, inserted into the Citadel on February 12 during the Battle for Hue, later wrote,
“. . .These damnable rules of engagement . . . prevented American fighting men from
using the only tactical assets that gave us an advantage during firefights--that of our
vastly superior firepower represented by air strikes, artillery and naval gunfire--these
orders continued to remain in force and hinder, wound and kill 1/5 Marines until the
fourth day of fighting inside the Citadel of Hue.”111
Due to initial restrictions on artillery and air strikes and the fact that most of the
available artillery from Phu Bai was directed at interdicting enemy escape routes around
the city, the Marines relied on company-level 60mm and 81mm mortars for close-in fire
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support. They developed several techniques with the mortars to offset the loss of heavier
artillery. Marines directed mortar fire onto building rooftops to cause them to collapse
onto NVA soldiers below. The Marines used mortars to protect their movements. By
dropping white phosphorous rounds to obscure their maneuver followed by high
explosive rounds to ensure NVA forces remained suppressed, the Marines could navigate
across streets and in between buildings without risk of casualties. The mortars proved
useful against enemy soldiers fleeing from buildings assaulted by the Marines. By preregistering on both the objective building and the street to that building’s rear, the
Marines were able to inflict heavy casualties by shifting fire from the objective to the rear
street as they pushed the enemy soldiers out of the building.112
The fierce fighting within Hue trapped almost 140,000 people in the
between two forces. Refugee control quickly became a significant challenge as citizens
either fled or cowered in their homes. Captain Christmas, Company H, 2-5 Marines
explained there were three areas on refugee control that require consideration, “First is
the intelligence which can be gained from these refugees. Second is the interference of
these folks when you are in the attack; and, finally, enemy infiltration within their
ranks.”113 Building after building cleared found civilians hiding from NVA soldiers.
NVA plans called for VC cadre to gather South Vietnamese citizens who worked for or
supported the South Vietnamese government. These teams roamed throughout the city
streets, snatching government employees, doctors, teachers, lawyers, and supporters and
either evacuating them from the city for “reeducation” or executed them after extensive
interrogations. Hue citizens witnessing the carnage hid in their homes fearful for their
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lives, awaiting rescue by ARVN or US forces. Every turn in the fighting flushed out
hundreds of Vietnamese civilians of every age. Whole families were able to survive the
shelling and street warfare by taking refuge in small bunkers constructed in their homes.
The Marines exacerbated the problem of refugee control over the next weeks as they
liberated the city. The huge influx of refugees created a logistical and security nightmare
for U.S. and ARVN forces in Hue. The Marines quickly developed techniques to
question the civilians, gaining detailed intelligence of NVA activity and locations.
During assaults on homes, Marines constantly encountered civilians, sometimes with
devastating consequences. Once the Marines cleared a block of homes and buildings and
established a safe corridor, they escorted their Vietnamese charges safely to collection
points. Providing for thousands of refugees, however, sapped the logistical system. Most
of the refugees were innocent civilians, but some were enemy soldiers or sympathizers-and many were ARVN troops trapped at home on leave for the Tet holidays. All of the
ARVN soldiers who were fit for duty helped the Marines and MACV advisors with the
refugees. The Allies had to do something about the growing flood of refugees and
displaced persons as the battle raged.
One of the many tasks performed by the 1st Marine Regiment was to establish city
services. The Regimental S-5, Civil Affairs Officer, set up refugee centers on both sides
of the Perfume River to shelter, feed and treat the influx of displaced civilians. They
distributed food to each center with very little problem. Once the Marines captured the
hospital, Colonel Stan Hughes, Commander of the 1st Marine Regiment, ordered it
cleaned and reopened to handle the enormous civilian casualties. The Allied forces
began the task of burying the dead to prevent the spread of disease. They assisted the city
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government to restore water and power.114 With the assistance of the local Catholic
hierarchy and American resources and personnel, the South Vietnamese government
officials tried to restore order and normalcy in the city. By the end of February, a fulltime refugee administrator was in place, and the local government slowly began to
function once more.
There are many more lessons learned from this battle that have earned a place in
U.S. Marine Corps and Army doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures, unit standard
operating procedures (SOPs) that are not accounted for in this study. Recent Joint
doctrine highlight Hue as a sterling example of the urban triad of physical terrain,
noncombatant population and service infrastructure systems that operational and tactical
commanders must address as part of urban operations.115 Urban operations are multidimensional problems of interior, exterior, vertical, surface and subsurface that tactical
leaders need to examine to devise attack and defensive options. Deliberate urban
operations require a balance of speed with security, multiple points of entry while
minimizing collateral damage, and ensuring a large reserve that permits continuous and
flexible operations. Deliberate operations are characterized by precision attack with
direct and indirect fires, aviation, and stand-off capabilities from multiple axes,
simultaneously maintaining secure lines of communications to evacuate or move
noncombatants and sustain operations. Leaders and planners must account for the human
dimension and its influence in every aspect of urban operations. Tactical commanders
must ascertain what the impact of their operations will be on the environment; in other
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words, they must deal with issues such as disease, hazard material threats, criminal
threats, and public opinion. 116 U.S. armed forces must continue to examine these lessons
faced by the allies during their assault on Hue. The key factors discussed are the subject
of much debate in the Combat Developments community of the U.S. Marine Corps and
U.S. Army. Continued study of this battle should yield new insights into what U.S.
armed forces may face in the future.
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CHAPTER 4
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
You’ll go to war the way you are today…not the way you want to be. Regardless of your
shortages in personnel, the time that you have available to train, or the resources that
you have on hand, you’ve got to get on with it. – Brigadier General David Grange117
The Battle for Hue offers a unique prism for viewing emerging doctrine for urban
operations. Since this battle, the world has changed dramatically, with a phenomenal
growth of urban areas. Many of these cities are incapable of providing basic services to
the millions of inhabitants. Corruption of governments and an absence of social services
lead to a “survival of the fittest” mentality.118 The challenges U.S. forces will face are
identical to those the Marines encountered in Hue. The relevance of training in urban
operations is more important today than in recent years. With the vast majority of its
armed forces based in the United States, the American military will have to conduct force
projection operations that require support facilities such as sea and airports of
debarkation. These facilities are primarily located in or near urban areas. Hence, urban
operations will be required under almost any scenario that requires deployment.119 U.S.
combat units must prepare to conduct opposed and unopposed forced entry that most
likely will involve operations in urban environments. So what must the military do to
prepare for the eventuality of urban warfare?
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General Charles C. Krulak, former Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps,
declared his Marines must prepare for the “Three Block War,” in which they will find
themselves conducting different types of operations within an urban complex.120 This
requires extensive training in a myriad of tasks ranging from food distribution, noncombatant evacuation, medical treatment, and social services reconstruction to riot
control, and finally, to combat operations. The American military needs to develop joint
and combined arms training methods and facilities that enable units to conduct multiple
operations within an urban environment. The Marines at Hue knew the importance of
joint and combined arms effort to clear the city, but a lack of training constantly hindered
efforts to bring the full measure of combat power to bear on the battlefield. The first and
probably last exposure to close-quarter combat training occurred during basic training at
Parris Island, so fighting in Hue highlighted the deficiencies in USMC doctrine and
training. The Marines learned their lessons the hard way by trial and error, a process
costly in casualties. Clearing buildings, room-by-room and block-by-block,
demonstrated the difficulties encountered by a well-motivated and entrenched enemy
with superior defensive lines of fire and training in city fighting. At Hue the Marines
experienced directed fires from every dimension and they had to adopt techniques that
methodically eliminated every angle from which the enemy placed fires on them. “The
layout of the street also provided the opportunity to prepare well-camouflaged, almost
invisible positions between houses at the base of the thick, ancient foliage growing
between the houses,” Nicholas Warr recalled. “For four days, we had been directing our
fires at the windows and doors, and although we had most certainly been taking enemy
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fires from those positions, we had also been taking deadly enemy fire from ground level,
from the fighting holes dug in under the bushes between many houses.”121 Today’s U.S.
ground troops, both soldiers and marines as well as special operations forces, must train
to encounter an enemy engaging from every angle and position to gain positional
advantage over superior U.S. firepower. Only in the past few years has the military
begun training in the variety of tasks associated with fighting in urban areas. Current
engagement policies demand that U.S. forces be able to execute tasks not normally part
of a unit’s wartime mission, such as separation of belligerents within a town, riot
prevention and control, search and seizure of weapon caches, counterinsurgency
operations, humanitarian relief, support to domestic agencies, law enforcement, and
close-quarter combat if necessary. These tasks require a shift in doctrine to take into
account the complexities of urban warfare and the challenges they must train and prepare
to overcome.
In 1968, training doctrine was limited to a couple of manuals that did not meet the
contingencies faced by Marines and soldiers fighting in Hue. Marine Corps’ urban
operations doctrine, embodied in Combat in Built-Up Areas and Attack on a Fortified
Position, summed up what Lieutenant Colonel Cheatham has learned from his research
prior to departing for Hue: the best way to fight through a city was to “gas the enemy,
blow things up, and then clear out the ruins.”122 These tactics, designed to overcome
quickly an enemy entrenched position through use of direct fire and fire support, ensured
the eventual success of the Marines but required lethal instruction from their enemy.
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Brute force mentality and raw courage, though successful, caused numerous casualties
among the Marines. More disturbing than the fact that the battalion commander had to
search for ways to destroy his enemy is that the Marines under him knew even less and
paid a stiff price to relearn tactical methods to extract NVA forces.
Today, these methods seem archaic when confronted with the challenges faced
after destruction of a major city. Emerging U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrine covers
in detail tactics, techniques and procedures on how to fight in complex urban
environments. The Marines’ newest manual, MCWP 3-35.3 Military Operations in
Urban Terrain, provides detailed operational and tactical instruction that reflects many of
the important lessons learned at Hue about fire, maneuver, and communication in a
complex environment. It furnishes the appropriate TTPs required of all marines to
destroy an entrenched enemy without the horrific effects of pulverizing the city itself.
Minimizing collateral damage and civilian casualties is just as important as the methods
used to fight in urban environments. As the Department of Defense’s lead agency, the
USMC is on the cutting edge of urban warfare. What remains to determine is if these
TTPs are the correct ones for future operations to ensure mission accomplishment with
minimal casualties.
The U.S. Army has also worked recently on changing its doctrine to face the
myriad of urban warfare challenges. The recently published Field Manual (FM) 3-06.11,
Combined Arms Operations in Urban Terrain incorporates TTPs that encapsulates the
lessons of Hue, Somalia, and Grozny to ensure overwhelming force applied to any urban
situation. Army operational concept dictates that forces engaged must Assess the urban
environment, Shape the conditions to isolate the battlefield, Dominate by conducting
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simultaneous and sequential actions to establish pre-eminent control over decisive points,
and then Transition to further missions such as peace enforcement, peace keeping, or
transfer of control to local or international authorities.123 This operational concept
provides a cornerstone for future operations against a variety of urban conflicts.
The shortcoming of the two abovementioned manuals is the stress on actual
combat operations. Although an analysis of tactical combat operations is certainly the
scope of this study, further research must address operations in urban environments that
do not necessarily involve combat, but that will challenge U.S. forces. For instance, U.S.
doctrine expounds little on counterinsurgency operations, peace support operations, and
humanitarian relief operations, working with non-governmental agencies, training police
forces, infrastructure construction, and development of local government. These tasks
are extremely difficult, and while not addressed by the Marines in Hue in 1968, they are
certainly required to maintain peace in an ever-growing urban conflict. To assist U.S.
forces facing these challenges and be successful on any urban battlefield, they must have
the tools to help them mitigate problems, and dominate over the full spectrum of
operations we encounter.
In 1968, the Marines used a variety of weapons to figure out the best way to
destroy an entrenched enemy. The integration of the NVA defense was extremely
complex and deadly. It required the Marines to use every weapon in their arsenal to
recapture the city. The combined use of tanks and Ontos to blast their way through walls
and buildings followed by aggressive assault of infantryman proved both effective and
destructive. This technique caused substantial casualties and left the city of Hue in ruins.
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“The Citadel had been dealt a rougher blow with the air strikes, naval gunfire, and
artillery along the northeast wall and other places,” Keith Nolan wrote of Hue after the
battle. “The estimates tallied 10,000 houses either destroyed or damaged, roughly forty
percent of the city.”124 One of the tenets of evolving doctrine requires U.S. forces
engaged in urban warfare to minimize collateral damage. Recent developments in
precision-guided munitions provide the means to destroy a single building without
significant impact to surrounding ones. The real difficulty for ground troops is house-tohouse clearance of a city or street. The latest doctrine gives detailed instructions on
clearance, but the results may be very similar to that of Hue. To avoid this, new weapons
that create the capability to defeat or destroy an enemy without the resulting collateral
damage are required. The Department of Defense must develop non-lethal weapons that
enable ground forces to quell riots, maintain order and disable threats with minimal force.
DOD must develop technologies that enable ground forces to “see” the enemy and
develop the situation to determine the amount of force required. The extensive use of
smaller Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) down to platoon and squad level enables
them to mitigate risks, prevent surprise, and develop courses of action to defeat a threat.
Man-portable thermobaric devices can give ground forces the edge they need to defeat
entrenched enemy forces without exposure to enemy fires. The Marines’ ingenuity
enabled them to overcome their technological difficulties and develop methods to
succeed and defeat their adversary. The American warrior of the 21st century will have at
his disposal a vast arsenal to safeguard his men, assess the situation, and overwhelm the
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enemy and transition to a follow-on mission while preventing undue collateral damage
and civilian casualties.
Among the most complex challenges in urban warfare that the U.S. military faces
is the need for carefully structured rules of engagement (ROE). U.S. forces must have
the flexibility to apply combat power to defeat an urban adversary without unnecessary
political guidance to hamstring its effort. They must operate under flexible ROE that do
not restrict their ability to perform the mission assigned with all capabilities possessed.
American troops will often engage an adversary who does not abide by any ROE but is
quick to complain of violations they may commit of their own rules. They will operate
on an urban conflict spectrum from ethnic cleansing, terrorism, suicide bombing,
indiscriminate use of booby traps and mines, hostage taking, sabotage, and efforts to
obtain favorable media attention.125 The American military must prepare itself for all
eventualities in order to avoid frustration and anger caused by restrictive ROE. U.S.
forces must train on an ROE to become comfortable operating in a restrictive
environment. They must drill “what-if” scenarios down to the fire-team level because
often, young sergeants and corporals make difficult decisions that can have grave
strategic consequences. Commanders at all levels must assess the operational and tactical
risks associated with an inability to respond with the full measure of force. The risk
assessment must account for political, social, racial, ethical, and economics factors that
will have direct bearing on the effectiveness of combat operations.126
The Battle for Hue opened a window on the likely battlefield of the 21st century.
There are many challenges that remain which the U.S. armed forces must address through
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technology, doctrine, training, and policy. Knowledge of the enemy and situational
understanding are two crucial components in urban operations. When they received their
orders to move to Hue, Captain Batcheller lacked any substantial information to facilitate
his unit’s mission. Moving blindly into the city, A/1-1 Marines stumbled into a web of
entrenched NVA forces that began a 26-day process to extract systematically resulting in
terrible casualties. U.S. military leaders must ensure that American forces today remain
fully trained in the myriad of complex tasks required to fight in urban environment. The
country cannot afford to face unprepared an enemy as aggressive and well- trained as the
NVA and VC forces were in city street-fighting. The Marines’ focus on jungle war
fighting caught them completely unaware and unprepared for the battle they encountered
at Hue. Only through raw determination, superior firepower, and adaptive leadership
were they able to overcome enemy forces and recapture the city. U.S. armed forces,
already possessing the advantage of superior technology, aggressive small-unit
leadership, and high espirit-de-corps, must complement those strengths with the
integration of demanding urban operations training into every type of mission training
environment. The Battle for Hue provides a means to measure the multitude of threats
the American military may encounter on a future urban battlefield. That conflict stands a
grim example of the lethality of a well-trained enemy entrenched in an urban setting and
facing unprepared forces. It was an experience that must not be repeated.
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